Review of administrative decisions under the Federal Court Act (1970)

Abstract. It does not appear, at this time, that the average citizen's position vis-á-vis federal administrative agencies has been improved under the Federal Court Act (1970). For one thing, as might be expected, the Act does not require boards, beyond the rules of natural justice, to conduct their hearings according to certain minimum standards of procedure. In addition, it attempts to prohibit a role Canaidan courts have claimed to review the decisions of boards and commissions that are administrative in nature. Of course, in non-discretionary matters the prerogative writs are still available, although original jurisdiction in their issuance has been given exclusively to the itinerant Trial Division of the Federal Court. Under the Act, the Federal Court of Appeal is given original jurisdiction to review and set aside judicial or quasi-judicial decisions on certain grounds. But two of the grounds are substantially similar to those on which the prerogative remedies are issued. The final ground must await judicial interpretation for clarification. Its loose wording permits numerous possibilities for construction. If given a broad interpretation, certain expert and impartial boards will be, in effect, superseded in much of their decision-making power by the Court of Appeal. Sommaire. A l'heure actuelle, il ne semble pas que la position du citoyen moyen face aux agences administratives fédérates ait été améliorée par la Loi sur les tribunaux fédéraux (1970). Tout d'abord, comme on pourrait s'y attendre, la Loi n'oblige pas les conseils à observer des normes minimales de procédure dans la tenue des audiences en dehors du respect des règies de la justice humaine. Par ailleurs, elle cherch à priver les tribunaux canadiens d'un rôle qu'ils avaient assumé: la révision des décisions des conseils et commissions de caractère administratif. Bien sûr, dans les questions non-discrétionnaires, les recours à l'ordonnance émise en vertu de la prérogative royale existent toujours mais c'est uniquement à la section itinérante du tribunal fédéral que revient la juridiction originale pour leur émission. En vertu de cette Loi, la Cour d'appel fédérale détient la juridiction originale pour réviser et casser les décisions judiciaires ou quasi-judiciaires pour certains motifs. Deux des motifs ressemblent beaucoup à ceux qui permettent les recours en vertu de la prérogative royale. Le motif d'appel en dernier ressort ne pourra être éclairci qu'après interprétation judiciaire. Le texte est rédigé de façon si vague qu'il se prête à de nombreuses interprétations. S'il est pris dans un sens général, certains tribunaux experts et impartiaux verront en effect leurs décisions dépendre en grande partie de la Cour d'appel.     

'Inevitable and Unacceptable?' Methodological Rawlsianism in Anglo-American Political Philosophy

This article attempts two parallel tasks. First, it gives a sympathetic explication of the implicit working methodology ('Methodological Rawlsianism') of mainstream contemporary political theory in the English-speaking world. And second, principally in footnotes, it surveys the recent literature on justification to see what light these debates cast on the tenets of this methodology. It is worth examining methodological presuppositions because these can have a profound influence on substantive theories: many of the differences between philosophical traditions can be traced to their methodologies. My aim is to expose the central features of methodological Rawlsianism in order to challenge critics of this tradition to explain exactly where and why they depart from the method. While I do not defend it at length, I do suggest that methodological Rawlsianism is inevitable insofar as it is basically a form of common sense. This fact should probably lower expectations about the amount of progress consistent methodological Rawlsians are likely to make in grounding comprehensive normative political theories.