伙伴关系特征、网络行为与公共性： 有关可持续发展项目绩效的证据

摘要: 本文探索在复杂的可持续发展政策领域内的伙伴关系特征、网络行为与公共性之间的关系。本研究以香港为背景,该城市正在从命令—控制的政策手段逐渐转向对伙伴关系 和利益相关者参与的运用。本文认为,承诺、平等、相互性和信任等网络伙伴关系特征和网络行为会在公共性程度上有所不同,但它们总体上对于可持续发展项目的绩效具有正面的贡献。本研究的数据来自于28个可持续发展的咨询委员会或代表性组织的成员(57%的回应率),最后得到53个可持续发展项目的可用数据。分析结果显示在可持续发展项目中的政府、企业和公民社会成员并不认为在伙伴关系特征与感知到的项目绩效间存在很大的分别,但认为伙伴关系特征与网络行为存在很大的分别。多重回归分析显示信任有助于促进感知到的项目绩效,私人部门和公民社会团体人员的网络行为特征也有相同效果,尽管对于公民社会团体人员来说,网络行为与项目绩效存在负面关系。文章的结论讨论了这些研究结果对于香港以及其他地区的可持续发展项目的意义。     

CO‐OFFENDING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DELINQUENT CAREER*

This article examines the role of co‐offending in the development of the delinquent career. Hypotheses derived from Reiss's (1986, 1988) taxonomic theory of co‐offending are tested, using police‐reported data on the delinquent careers and co‐offending of 55,336 Canadian offenders. Support is found for a taxonomic theory and for age‐related and functional theories of co‐offending. The taxonomy consists of two types of offenders—high activity (3 percent) and low activity (97 percent)—whose co‐offending patterns differ during the teenage years but not during childhood. For low‐activity offenders as teenagers, the proportion of co‐offenses decreases with criminal experience. The rate of co‐offending by high‐activity offenders as teenagers is lower at onset than for low‐activity offenders, and it varies little with criminal experience. For both offender types, the proportion of co‐offenses decreases with age, is slightly less in males, and varies with the type of offense. For both offender types, the proportion of co‐offenses in childhood offending is greater than in the teenage years and is unrelated to the offender's age or criminal experience.     

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM – GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE

Failure to understand the political nature of administrative reform and to develop a political strategy to overcome resistance lies behind the failure of many reform attempts. The prerequisites of reform include political will, time, resources, an ongoing institution promoting change, and a strategy which concentrates on the implementation stage when resistance is strongest. Such a strategy must use the principal levers of change, including legislation, which directly affect administrative behaviour. In Australia in the 1970s administrative reform proceeded only slowly with the exception of changes in some States and the introduction of a new body of Federal administrative law. A better reform strategy in the past two years has resulted in extensive legislative change at the Federal level including greater ministerial control over certain senior appointments, open public competition for the top one per cent of civil service jobs, affirmative action and industrial democracy. There has thus been a further shift towards a unique Australian model of public administration.