REJOINDER TO GARDNER'S "COMMENTARY ON KELLY AND JOHNSTON'S 'THE ALIENATED CHILD: A REFORMULATION OF PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME'"

In this reply to Richard Gardner, we outline our points of disagreement with his formulation of parental alienation syndrome (PAS), showing that his focus on the alienating parent as the primary cause of children's negative attitudes and rejecting behavior toward the other parent is overly simplistic and not supported by findings from recent empirical research. It follows that we strongly object to Gardner's recommendations for legal and mental health interventions with alienated children as well as the use of the term PAS when referring to this problem.     

How do I vote the scoundrels out? Why voters might not punish corrupt politicians at the polls

While we frequently hope electoral democracy can serve as an important constraint on corruption, there are good reasons to think that such might not be the case. This paper analyzes two closely-related questions: should we expect voters to punish corrupt politicians or parties at the polls, and should we expect such influences to check corruption generally? While there have been clear-cut cases in which such punishments have been massive and decisive, they are much the exception. Indeed, a variety of factors having to do with corruption as a concept and as a political issue, the nature of competitive electoral politics, and more recent economic and political trends reshaping important aspects of liberal democracy, all point toward a pessimistic assessment. Ideas for changing that state of affairs are few, because the difficulties reside less at the level of fixable “problems” and more with the inherent workings of liberal political and economic systems. Efforts to improve the quality of news coverage and civic education, however, and any prospects for strengthening and deepening civil society, may hold out some hope for the longer term.     

Outsourcing Public Service Delivery: Management Responses in Noncompetitive Markets

Capturing the benefits of competition is a key argument for outsourcing public services, yet public service markets often lack sufficient competition. The authors use survey and interview data from U.S. local governments to explore the responses of public managers to noncompetitive markets. This research indicates that competition is weak in most local government markets (fewer than two alternative providers on average across 67 services measured), and that the relationship between competition and contracting choice varies by service type. Public managers respond to suboptimal market competition by intervening with strategies designed to create, sustain, and enhance provider markets. In monopoly service markets, managers are more likely to use intergovernmental contracting, while for‐profit contracting is more common in more competitive service markets. The strategies that public managers employ to build and sustain competition for contracts often require tangible investments of administrative resources that add to the transaction costs of contracting in noncompetitive markets.     

Ecological Inference and Entropy-Maximizing: An Alternative Estimation Procedure for Split-Ticket Voting

Publication of King's A Solution to the Ecological InferenceProblem has rekindled interest in the estimation of unknowncell values in two- and three-dimensional matrices from knowledgeof the marginal sums. This paper outlines an entropy-maximizing(EM) procedure which employs more constraints than King's EImethod and produces mathematical rather than statistical procedures:the estimates are maximum-likelihood values. The mathematicsare outlined, and the procedure's use illustrated with a studyof ticket-splitting at New Zealand's first (1996) general electionusing the mixed-member proportional representation system, forwhich official figures provide a check against the EM estimateof the number voting a straight party ticket in each constituency.