Budgeting for Federal Capital

This article examines the issues involved in federal investment budgeting and planning for the acquisition of federally-owned assets. It describes the unique role of the federal government and examines the different issues and reforms prompted by differing types of capital and investment sponsored at the federal level. It suggests that meaningful changes can be instituted in our budgeting practices that can make a difference for our budgetary choices without adopting a full-scale capital budget. It also presents a framework for improving federal agency capital decision making based on a study of practices used by leading state and local and private sector organizations. The article is based on testimony delivered before the President's Commission to Study Capital Budgeting.     

Complexity in local stakeholder coordination: decentralization and community water management in Northern Ghana

Stakeholder coordination is a prominent theme in current development discourse. Experience with decentralization and community water management in northern Ghana highlights the complexities of coordinating stakeholders at the local level. In this case, roles and responsibilities must be clarified between legislated sub‐district structures on the one hand, and civic water groups on the other. This is especially important with regard to resolving which party should collect revenues and manage assets and expenditures in the water sector. The key mechanism for addressing these issues is the District Assembly, which is empowered under the decentralization law to coordinate stakeholders, both ‘horizontally’, across social actors, and ‘vertically’, between the national and sub‐district levels. While such local‐level dynamics are indeed complex and challenging, they are at the same time probably more amenable to at least medium‐term resolution than stakeholder competition issues at the national level. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Invisible decisive coalitions in large hierarchies

This paper examines the extent to which organizational hierarchies are democratic or (in the more usual language of administrative studies) participative, in the sense that the views of a large proportion of organizational membership are taken into account when an organizational choice is made. We view organizations as making choices in a “bottom-up” manner: subordinates recommend options to their superior, and if subordinates are in sufficient agreement their superior accepts their advice. We prove that as the number of levels in the hierarchy increases, organizational choices can be dominated by a smaller and smaller proportion of the total organizational membership. In the limit, a vanishing small proportion of the membership can dominate policymaking.     

Books in review

Among his forthcoming books are Psychology and Tortureand Psychology and Social Policy (edited with P.E. Tetlock).