Political entrepreneurship and the formation of special districts

Where general purpose governments provide a bundle of services within their boundaries, special district governments provide specific services inside the boundaries of general purpose governments. The alternative to forming a special purpose government is providing the service within a general purpose government. Formation of a special district represents the establishment of a new political enterprise, in contrast to the addition of a new product line to an existing government. We explore the formation of special districts as a particular form of the universal entrepreneurial search for gain or profit from exchange. Political entrepreneurship, like market entrepreneurship, operates inside some framework of rules, and the formation of special districts reflects the search for political gain within that framework of rules. We use an entrepreneurial framework to formulate several hypotheses concerning the formation and organization of special districts.     

Municipal corporations, economic calculation, and political pricing: exploring a theoretical antinomy

Most thinking about political economy treats states as unitary actors. In contrast, this paper treats states as ecologies of politically-based enterprises. Where a market is a congeries of business enterprises, a state is a congeries of political enterprises. Both sets of enterprises compete with one another in a setting where those who manage corporate capital are largely separate from those who supply it. Competition among political enterprises, however, cannot generate market prices because of the inalienability of property rights. In consequence, what arises is a system of pricing and calculation that exists parasitically upon the system of market prices.     

A Critical Assessment of Using Children to Participate Actively in Hostilities in Lubanga Child Soldiers and Direct Participation

The first judgment of the International Criminal Court, delivered on 9 March 2012, raises a pivotal and equally controversial issue of what constitutes ‘active participation in hostilities’ for the purpose of the child solider offences under the Rome Statute in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. The Majority (Judge Fulford and Judge Blattmann) adopted a broad definition of the notion of ‘active’ participation and the Minority (Judge Benito) an even more ample one. This was achieved by distinguishing between ‘active participation in hostilities’ and ‘direct participation in hostilities’ and by recourse to the travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute and to human rights norms. The purpose of this contribution is to demonstrate that the meaning of ‘active participation in hostilities’ under Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute is not ambiguous or obscure, but is the same as that of ‘direct participation in hostilities’ under international humanitarian law. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation by the Trial Chamber, be it to the travaux préparatoires, or to human rights norms, was unnecessary and misguided. The contribution will also draw some conclusions on how criminal liability before the ICC may be excluded for Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) or 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute on the basis of the broad definition adopted by the Trial Chamber of the notion of ‘active participation in hostilities’ and will discuss other consequences arising from the judgement at hand.