The Last Good Chance: A Reassessment of U.S. Operations at Tora Bora

The inability of the United States to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and many of his top deputies at Tora Bora is widely recognized as one of the most significant missed opportunities of America's struggle with al Qaeda. However, the debate over U.S. actions at Tora Bora during Operation Enduring Freedom lacks in-depth analysis, especially concerning the commonly offered solution of more U.S. troops on the ground. This paper dissects the original operation against al Qaeda forces entrenched in the mountain complex in eastern Afghanistan in late 2001 and its impact on the debate over the Afghan model of warfare. An alternative plan involving U.S. conventional forces is presented that takes into account the considerable constraints of the scenario and analyzes the key make-or-break points of the operation. Although the challenges are far greater than most critics have allowed, the revised plan would likely have offered the best chance to capture or kill Bin Laden and a significant portion of the al Qaeda leadership.     

Labor Unrest and Movements in 1989 and 1990

An American political scientist analyzes the Soviet miners' strikes of 1989 and their consequences during 1990. Focusing on the three coal-mining regions of the Kuzbas, Donbas, and Vorkuta, the paper is based on rare access to official and unofficial local newspapers and interviews. Included are analytical accounts of similarities and differences in the strikers' demands and strategies, as well as of efforts to form and sustain new local, regional, and national labor unions. The conceivable outcome of the unrest and organizations emerging in 1989 is discussed in light of developments through the end of 1990. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: 124, 830.     

Germany and the UK from convention to the IGC

The UK and Germany approached the Convention with rather closer positions on many key issues than popular image would have it, developed further common aims during the Convention, and both ended up relatively satisfied with the outcomes. Based on close observation of the Convention proceedings, this article explores this pattern of convergence, commencing with a discussion of the ‘visions’ that Joschka Fischer for Germany and Tony Blair for the UK brought to the debate, and developing the discussion through an analysis of how each government ‘played’ the Convention. Perhaps surprisingly the UK government was more adept at alliance-building, with the lead German representative, Fischer, seen as aloof and outflanked by Franco-German initiatives agreed by the respective heads of government.