Vietnam's Better War

When General Creighton Abrams took command of U.S. forces in Vietnam a better war resulted from his superior understanding of the war and more effective conduct of it, including improvement of South Vietnam's armed forces and emphasis on pacification. As American forces were progressively withdrawn, the South Vietnamese took on more and more of the load, winning the counterinsurgency war and fighting valiantly and effectively against the enemy's conventional invasion until the United States Congress drastically reduced materiel and financial assistance at the same time communist forces received massively increased support from their patrons. Thus, inevitably, South Vietnam succumbed.     

Intellection and Indiscipline

A discipline will usually become the object of study and its relationship to other disciplines a moment of concern when its borders are precarious and its definition in dispute. Law, 'the oldest social science', is arguably both prior to discipline — it emerges initially and most forcefully as a practice — and without discipline, its object being potentially all human behaviour. If law is necessarily between and among disciplines, both prone to moonlighting and everywhere homeless, it will also always be in some mode of scholarly crisis. Certain conclusions follow. Law is paradoxically dependent upon other disciplines for its access to the domains that it regulates. The greater its epistemic dependency, however, the slighter its political acknowledgment of that subordination. Which allows a positive thesis: the epistemic drift of law can carry the discipline to a frank acknowledgment of the value of indiscipline both to novelty and intellection.     

Learning from Contemporary Conflicts to Prepare for Future War

Recent and ongoing wartime experience has discredited much of the thinking that underpinned the “Defense Transformation” effort in the 1990s. If we are to be prepared for future conflict, it is vital that we learn from experience and adjust our thinking about war. It is time to develop idealized visions of future war that are consistent with what post-9/11 conflicts have revealed as the enduring uncertainty and complexity of war. These concepts should be “fighting-centric” rather than “knowledge-centric.” They should also be based on real and emerging threats, informed by recent combat experience, and connected to scenarios that direct military force toward the achievement of policy goals and objectives. We must then design and build balanced forces that are capable of conducting operations consistent with the concepts we develop.     

Narrations of Shifting Maya Identities

Three anthropological ways of narrating the historical formation of Maya identity have recently been outlined in an article by Kay Warren on intergenerational struggles of Mayan families in Guatemala. According to the anti-racism scheme, Maya identity forms as a reaction to ethnic opposition. The cultural continuity approach treats identity formation as persistence that occurs in spite of ethnic oppression. The third, ' mestizaje ' school of thought argues that assimilation has eroded indigenous identity to the extent that it only makes sense to speak of an intermediary ladino (or mestizo ) category. Warren argues that the previous antagonism between ethnographic approaches has obscured the coexistence of these narrations in families, where discontinuity and rejection of traditional Maya identities interplay with continuity and revitalisation. In this paper, I compare the narrations of shifting identities in Guatemala to local representations of socio-cultural change in Yucutan. Based upon research in Oxkutzcab, I attempt to show how the interpretations of intergenerational changes in language, dress, and occupation relate to a set of local and regional events that evade the mutually exclusive meta-narratives of change.     

Defense Management Challenges for the Next American President

The next American president will face a daunting list of national security problems, including a serious defense budget crunch. The budget crisis will be deepened by the global financial crisis, a tapering of supplemental funding associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the steady growth of military healthcare and other personnel costs. After six years of rapid defense budget increases, the Pentagon has lost the practice of matching strategy and resources. The next president will need to manage risk among investments in irregular warfare, counterterrorism, balancing new super powers, countering weapons of mass destruction, and traditional warfare. He will also need to begin to build non-military “soft power” capabilities outside of the Pentagon.     

Editorial

This fourth issue provides both a follow on from the debatesstarted in our first three editions and a specific theme, thepolicing of public disorder. Alongside terrorism, neighbourhoodpolicing and the use of force, we judged as we were planningthe first editions of this new journal that we should tacklefour of the big issues in policing. Unsurprisingly, given thatthey are such big issues, there are some common themes thatrun across all of them. The most substantial of these is accountabilityand oversight, which are covered in several of the articlesin this edition. In each of the previous editorials I have drawn on my own professionalcareer to provide comment and this editorial will be no exception.In the last quarter of century I have, in roles ranging froma