MI 6's Requirements Directorate: Integrating Intelligence into the Machinery of British Central Government

The following article examines the relationship between the British Secret Intelli-gence Service (SIS, a.k.a. MI 6) and the machinery of central government, particularly departments of state and other agencies which employ information generated by the SIS. It is argued the main link between the SIS and its consumers in British government is the SIS's requirements 'side', embodied throughout most of the post-war era in the form of a Requirements Directorate. The article argues that the Requirements mechanism operates as a line of communication between the SIS and its consumers separate from the Cabinet Office Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO), although there is overlap and interdependency between the two architectures. This discussion traces the development of the 'requirements side' from the interwar period up to the post-Cold War era using information from archival sources and a programme of interviews with former UK intelligence officials. It is further argued that the structure and process of the SIS 'requirements side' has developed and changed as a consequence of changes in the structure of demand in the machinery of British government, including adapting to the increasingly central role of the JIO. However, despite that increasingly central role of the JIO, the 'requirements side' has continued to serve as the first point of contact between the SIS and its customers in Whitehall.     

Tax and Expenditure Limitations and State and Local Fiscal Structure: An Empirical Assessment

The tax and expenditure limitation (TEL) "movement" of the 1970s and 1980s can be characterized in part as a struggle between local autonomy and state control. Undeniable shifts have occurred over the same period in state and local revenue systems and functional responsibilities. This article places these shifts within the context of this movement, using pooled, cross-sectional, time-series techniques for the period between 1970 and 1990, in an effort to assess its impacts. Findings suggest that TELs have resulted in increased centralization, lessened local responsiveness, increased use of local non-tax sources of revenue, and a sector less accommodating to the needs of dependent populations. TELs may have also had dubious effects on both the allocative efficiency and equity of the state and local public sector.     

Jesse Burkhead and the Multiple Uses of Federal Budgets: A Contemporary Perspective

The work of Jesse Burkhead continues to have great relevance today. Its germaneness could be taken as an indictment of how little progress has been made in federal budgeting in the past half century, but it also says a great deal about Burkhead's insights and the lasting legacy of his work. This article discusses some of Burkhead's ideas on the use of the federal budget and their pertinence to the budget issues of today, including the role of the federal government in the economy, budgetary relations between presidents and Congresses, and the role of performance information in budgeting.     

Government and growth: Cross-sectional evidence

Economic theory suggests that government contributes to total economic growth in two ways: positively, through the provision of Pigovian public goods and services; and negatively, through the inefficient provision of such goods and services and the distortionary effects attendant with their provision. This paper develops a model that differentiates the two effects and empirically tests the model for a sample of forty-eight countries. Evidence suggests that the net effect of government on growth is positive, but that the negative effects are not insignificant. Though growth in government output contributes to total economic growth, at the margin this is approximately offset by distortionary effects attendant with increases in the relative size of government.     

Do governors get what they want?: An alternative examination of the line-item veto

This paper reconsiders the impact of the governor's line-item veto on the state budget process. The governor's ability to obtain his or her most desired budget measures item veto effectiveness, rather than a smaller expenditure budget. The percentage difference between the final state budget and the governor's original budget request over fiscal years 1983–1989 is examined. The empirical results indicate that under certain political situations the line-item veto authority enhances the governor's ability to obtain his or her desired budget.We would like to thank the Editors for helpful comments and suggestions.     

A political theory of intergovernmental grants

This paper formulates a political theory of intergovernmental grants. A model of vote-maximizing federal politicians is developed. Grants are assumed to buy the support of state voters and the ‘political capital or resources’ of state politicians and interest groups which can be used to further increase the support of state voters for the federal politician. The model is tested for 49 states. Similarity of party affiliation between federal and state politicians and the size of the Democrat majority in the state legislature increases the per capita dollar amount of grants made to a state. Likewise, increases in both the size of the state bureaucracy and union membership lead to greater grants for a state. Over time, the importance of interest groups (bureaucracy and unions) has increased relative to political groups (state politicians).