REAGANISM AS CORPORATE LIBERALISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN FUTURE

The "corporate liberal" regime that held together in America from the end of World War I1 to the 1960s was marked by broad agreement on ideology, public policy and a stable ruling coalition centered in the Democratic Party. This regime unraveled in the late 1960s and 1970s with the relative decline in American military and economic hegemony and the rise of a "left liberal insurgency". Key corporate liberal intellectuals and constituencies migrated to the Republican Party under Reagan. Reaganism will not sustain itself because its coalition partners are too disparate, its failure to transform the Republicans into a majority party, a lack of consensus on many issues, and the continued decline of the U.S. in the international economy. Corporate liberalism will find itself migrating to a revitalized Democratic Party, under a centrist leadership favoring fiscal responsibility, government-corporate partnerships, and a more efficient military.     

AN EVALUATION OF FURTHER REFORMS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS

By 1992, the party of the majority, the Democratic Party, will have been out of power for twenty years of a twenty-four year span. Since 1968, numerous reforms in the presidential nominating process have been considered and adopted by the Democrats. These reforms have had the effect of opening the nominating process to rank-and-file Democrats through state primaries and participatory caucuses. While the reforms achieve this purpose, the end result is a mixed system that has been described as a disjointed hodgepodge of rules.
This article presents ten criteria of a sound nomination system. Then a panel of researchers and practitioners weighs seven options for further reform against the ten criteria. Several policy options are considered by the panel as improvements over the current presidential nomination system.     

Financial restraint management and budget control in Canadian provincial governments

Abstract: This study compares and contrasts approaches to the management of financial stress and restraint in four Canadian provincial governments in the period from 1983 to 1985. It indicates that a number of different approaches to restraint management are utilized by Canadian provinces to cope with shortfalls in revenue and policy changes that influence resource allocation decision-making. The four provinces reviewed - British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Nova Scotia - have managed restraint in different ways, each reflecting the politics and the socio-economic and cultural context within which government resource allocation decisions are made. Profiles of these provinces indicate how these factors have influenced financial stress management and budget control strategy. Provincial experience is compared on the following dimensions: overall restraint management strategy; employment policy; marketing the need for restraint; centralized versus participatory government decision authority and control; the use of evaluation in restraint decision-making; and the influence of ideology in restraint management strategy-setting. Sommaire: Cette étude compare et oppose les méthodes de gestion financière adoptées en période d'austérité budgétaire par quatre gouvernements provinciaux au Canada, de 1983 à 1985. Elle indique que les provinces du Canada suivent diverses orientations en matière de gestion durant une période d'austérité budgétaire pour faire face aux manques de revenus et aux changements de politiques qui influencent les décisions d'allocation des ressources. Les quatre provinces étudiées, c'est-à-dire la Colombie-Britannique, la Saskatchewan, le Manitoba et la Nouvelle-Écosse, ont chacune adopté une orientation différence, reflétant le contexte politique, soeio-économique et culturel particulier dans lequel sont prises les décisions gouvernementales d'allocation des ressources. Les profils de la Colombie-Britannique, du Manitoba, de la Nouvelle-Éeosse et de la Saskatchewan précisent la manière dont ces facteurs ont influé sur la gestion de I'austérité financière et la stratégie de contrôle budgétaire. La comparaison entre les provinces porte sur les aspects suivants: 1) stratégie globale de gestion en période d'austérité, 2) politique d'emploi, 3) sensibilisation du public au besoin d'austérité, 4) autorité et contrôle décisionnels concentrés ou participatoires de la part du gouvernement, 5) rôle de 1'évaluation dans la prise des décisions en période d'austérité, et 6) influence de l'idéologie sur la définition des stratégies de gestion de l'austérite.     

The optimal size of government

In the economic analysis of the theory of government, two views of government are evident. The Pigovian view sees government as a benevolent actor striving to correct for the inadequacies and excesses of an unrestrained marketplace. The ‘Public Choice’ view of government portrays government as the tool of special interest groups as likely to generate distortions as to correct them. In this paper, a model of government that incorporates both views will be developed and then empirically tested. The model developed assumes that all expenditures by the government are inputs into the private sector production. Treating government expenditures as inputs into the production of private sector output, there is some optimal size of government that maximizes private sector output. The model incorporates a general production function for private sector output. Output is a function of private labor, private capital, and government expenditures. The Pigovian and Public Choice views of government are reflected in the assumed impact of G on the marginal productivities of L and K. The model is tested using United States data and a Cobb-Douglas production function. Estimates indicate that the 1983 level of government expenditures exceeds by 87 percent the level that would maximize private sector output. Reducing government from $ 491 billion to $ 263 billion and shifting the freed labor to the private sector would increase output from $ 1187 billion to $ 1451 billion.     

The 1984 election as Anthony downs and Stanley Kelley might interpret it

This paper is an analysis of two rational choice theories of elections. Anthony Downs and Stanley Kelley's theories yield complementary interpretations of the 1984 U. S. election. Reagan's victory was based on both prospective and retrospective judgments as well as on candidate and policy considerations. Reagan won that element of an incumbent's reelection that is a referendum on his performance as president. However, people also voted on the basis of domestic and foreign policy preferences for the second term. On these issues voters preferred Mondale as much as Reagan. Reagan's victory owed remarkably little to his conservative agenda and to a warm regard for his personal qualities as a leader. His landslide was deceptive. The two Reagan victories were among the weakest of the six landslides of the postwar period by Kelley's test of decisiveness. The Reagan elections have not set the United States on the course of a long-term conservative agenda in either domestic or foreign affairs.