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One of the most distinctive features of new democracies is the presence of political parties associated with the old, repressive regime. This article investigates whether or not the Eastern European variant of these parties, which we call communist successor parties (CSPs), has affected coalition politics. It finds that CSPs do have significant effects on the dynamics of coalition formation. CSPs are less likely than other parties to be included in governing coalitions; coalitions that include CSPs are more likely to be oversized (that is, to include superfluous parties); and CSPs that make it into government are penalized, insofar as they receive less than their fair share of governing portfolios. We attribute these results to the salience of the regime divide—the affective dislike of many citizens for the legacies of communism. Our results extend research on coalition behavior to Eastern European contexts and show how affective dislike combined with vote‐seeking motivations can affect governing behavior. 相似文献
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JASON M. ROBERTS 《Legislative Studies Quarterly》2010,35(3):307-336
The modern Committee on Rules plays a critical role in structuring the agenda of the U.S. House of Representatives. In fact, resolutions from the Committee on Rules are the primary means through which controversial legislation reaches the House floor. But the Committee on Rules did not play a role in shaping the floor agenda until the 1880s and, despite intense scrutiny of episodes such as the institution of the Reed rules and the revolt against Speaker Cannon, our understanding of the role of the Committee on Rules is limited and skewed heavily toward the post‐World War II era. This limitation is unfortunate, because special rules play a starring role in major theories of legislative organization. In this article, I present analysis of the usage and historical development of special rules in the House, and I offer findings from my empirical analysis of the determinants of rule choice from 1881 to 1937. A nuanced interrogation of new data on special rules in this era reveals support for committee specialization and conditional party government as motives for rule choice in this era. 相似文献
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