The reorientation of place legislation in England in the 1690s

Summary

Mediating Conflict in the Swiss Diets of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries

The Helvetic Confederation developed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as a web of alliances between the most important urban and peasant republics (Orte) in the area of present‐day Switzerland. The only form of mediating conflicts laid down in the alliances was by tribunals of arbitration; but these were never recognised by all the Orte in the web of alliances and proved inadequate in the face of growing antagonisms and coalitions throughout the Confederacy. It became necessary to have recourse to political arrangements involving the interested parties. The forum for these arrangements was the Diets, meetings of deputies of all members of the Confederacy. These more or less represented the most important political forces. Difficulties arose only when there was no consensus in individual Orten and when the official deputies to the Diet represented only the magistrates (Obrigkeiten). In such cases it could happen, especially in matters of foreign policy, that individual groups went their own way and thwarted the decisions of the Diet. It usually took a long time to arrive at a consensus in the Diets because the deputies were bound by an ‘imperative mandate’ and the minority would mostly not accept the will of the majority. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries participation and the achievement of consensus were the conditions of joint action of the Helvetic Confederation.     

Social Learning,Self-Control,and Offending Specialization and Versatility among Friends

American Journal of Criminal Justice - While it is generally understood that people tend not to specialize in specific types of deviance, less is understood about offending specialization and...     

Peace-building and the predatory political economy of insecurity: evidence from Cambodia,East Timor and Afghanistan

International peace-building interventions in post-conflict countries are intended to transform the socio-political context that led to violence and thereby build a stable and lasting peace. Yet the UN's transitional governance approach to peace-building is ill-suited to the challenge of dealing with the predatory political economy of insecurity that often emerges in post-conflict societies. Evidence from peace-building attempts in Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan illustrates that the political economy incentives facing domestic elites in an environment of low credibility and weak institutionalisation lead to a cycle of patronage generation and distribution that undermine legitimate and effective governance. As a result, post-conflict countries are left vulnerable to renewed conflict and persistent insecurity. International interventions can only craft lasting peace by understanding the political economy of conflict persistence and the potential policy levers for altering, rather than perpetuating, those dynamics.     

Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Judicial Review

The role of the courts in the review of administrative rulemaking raises profound questions as to the legitimate interference of courts in the exercise of administrative activities, which are often carried out in the pursuance of a legislative mandate. In contrast to the review of administrative acts of individual application, the Union courts have shown a more hesitant approach in the review of administrative rulemaking activities. This contribution will discuss the review by the Union courts of administrative rulemaking for compliance with procedural as well as substantive standards and will explore whether a convincing rationale for their more deferential attitude to the review of administrative rules can be provided. The article will explore to what extent lessons can be learned from the jurisprudence of the federal courts in the USA, which have struggled, even after the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), with similar problems.