Regional and technological dualism: A dual‐dual development framework applied to Puerto Rico

A ‘dual‐dual’ framework is proposed which captures the prevailing regional dualism (between rural and urban areas) and technological dualism (between traditional and modern techniques). Six interdependent sectors are specified: 1) urban formal, 2) urban informal, 3) rural non‐farm formal, 4) rural non‐farm informal, 5) rural farm formal, and 6) rural farm informal. The framework is applied to the case of Puerto Rico and its experience with an ‘industrialisation‐first’ development strategy between 1950 and 1970. It is shown that this framework lends itself well to the analysis of such issues as the pattern of employment, migration, and income distribution among regions and sectors.     

Subcontracting,growth and capital accumulation in small‐scale firms in the textile industry in Turkey

This study examines capital accumulation and growth among subcontracting small‐scale textile firms. We find that, in spite of the higher average profitability of non‐subcontracting production relative to subcontracting, the average annual rate of capacity expansion between the two groups is not statistically different from the former. This implies that the higher average productive capacity of the non‐subcontractors relative to that of the subcontracting firms are due to differences in their initial capacity. The study further suggests that there may be no easy transition from subcontracting to independent production. For many subcontractor firms in the sample, the cost of inputs required for independent production exceeds the current value of their gross earnings by a multiple.     

The professional as public servant: the decision-making dilemma

Administrative decision-making is increasingly complicated today by conflicting responsibilities that pressure decision-makers in different directions. Public servants are responsible to the law, Congress, administrative superiors, the agencies in which they serve, and the public. Those public servants who are members of a profession, attempting to apply special expertise and knowledge to the solution of public problems, face a set of even more complex responsibilities, governed as they are by their own professional codes of conduct whose tenets must be melded with the other obligations of governmental decision-makers.

Conscientious governmental officials are likely to base their decisions on their responsibilities to the public, in light of moral and ethical criteria as well as professional standards (where applicable), while recognizing their accountability to their organizational superiors. Civil servants who are members of a profession frequently find themselves making extremely complex decisions for which they must accept the responsibility for the application of their professional ethics in the context of their many other obligations.

The decision-making task of professionals who are also civil servants is often, therefore, an especially difficult and painful one. Cases of deep moral conflict will occur as they try to resolve their conflicting responsibilities.     

The United States naval blockade of Iraq: a foreign policy and international law analysis

This is the second of a two part essay by Commander Rosen into the causes of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the modern law of blockade, the political wisdom and the lawfulness of imposing a limited blockade of Iraq. Defects in the current regime of blockade were explored.

In part II, Commander Rosen closely explores the legal justification for the U.S. use of force in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It is frequently overlooked that the U.S. naval blockade (it was called a “naval interdiction”) was a U.S.-only operation from August 12th until August 25, 1990. As a pedagogical exercise, this period is extremely important because the U.S. use of force (by its naval units), in response to a written request by deposed Emir of Kuwait, must be justified under the U.N. Charter to be proper under international law. Once the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of force on August 25, 1990 to enforce the U.N. embargo, then the operation became one in which the U.N., as a corporate body, was acting. Since most low intensity conflicts since 1945, have involved lawful use of force issues outside of Security Council purview, the U.S. unilateral military action (blockade) against Iraqi shipping must be analyzed. It is reasonable to anticipate that future controversies of this sort will occur because of philosophic divisions among the U.N. Security Council permanent members or because there is anaequate time for the U.N. “Security Council to meet and obtain the forces required to insert into a region of conflict. Resurrection of the moribund U.N. Military Staff Committee might be one of the lessons learned from this particular episode.

The United States had the benefit of a U.N. resolution on August 25, 1990 to justify its naval action. Before that date, the legal issue arises whether, in the early stages, national self-defense grounds permitted the use of force against Iraq (blockade) since deprivation of assured access to critical materials (oil) can be considered an act of aggression under some theories of international law. Commander Rosen concludes that the low intensity blockade was probably not authorized, under a theory of national self-defense, because the U.S. had no hard evidence on August 12, 1990 (the day the blockade commenced) that Saddam Hussein would deprive the U.S. of access to Gulf Oil supplies. But, because of the pervasive interdepencies of world economies, world food supplies, and petroleum access, the case was extremely close.

The customary international law of intervention (protection of nationals or humanitarian) and the law of collective self-defense was explored relative to the U.S. imposition of a limited naval blockade. Commander Rosen concludes that intervention theory will not support the limited naval blockade since there was insufficient evidence that U.S. citizens were in imminent danger (as in Grenada) and the blockade operation was too limited and indirect in scope to produce the type of rapid results which have come to be associated with a humanitarian intervention (as in the Congo). But, since Kuwait’s territorial sovereignty had been grossly violated as a result of illegal aggression, Kuwait was privileged under the U.N. Charter to request and receive defense assistance from the United States under Article 51 to recover lost territory. Arguments that the right to act in collective self-defense under Article 51 is limited to the nation which itself is attacked (or a nation closely aligned with the victim) are rejected as contrary to the U.N. norms of promoting community resistance to illegal aggression.

While the Persian Gulf dispute has resulted in open hostilities, international law issues existed whether, in the early stages, the blockade was militarily necessary and whether the blockade could be extended to the Jordanian port of Aqaba, because of conflicting reports as to Jordan’s adherence with the U.N. embargo, were explored. International law would probably not support an extension of the blockade to Aqaba because it would be seen an improper interference with Jordan’s neutrality. Similarly, forbidding the passage of U.N. medical and food convoys into Iraq was seen as a breach of international law provided such shipments were specifically authorized and supervised by the U.N. security council (to ensure that the food was only distributed to civilians).     

Public administrators and policy implementation--a social work perspective

Professional social workers in both macro and micro settings are vitally concerned with public policy, particularly that of social welfare policy, and its implementation. They are keenly aware of the quality and quantity of services and other end products of policy implementation. Social workers serve as public administrators and staff many public and private agencies that form the delivery system network. They are also concerned with social problem-solving as is the public administrator, and see themselves as behavior change agents. Their generalized value perspective addresses the political conflicts arising from the nature and causes of poverty and inequality, the role of government in society, and the nature and methodology of the decision-making process. Organization and administration become means to ends, not ends in themselves.

The conclusions arise that public administrators will have to assume more governmental responsibility, rather than less. This is seen as a natural evolutionary outgrowth of the need to regulate increased conflict fueled by growing interdependence and rapid societal change. While public agencies are continuing results of governmental intervention, they are condemned to operate in the midst of paradox.     

Management 2000

Public Management 2000 will need to do much more if it is to perform more effectively in an increasingly difficult and challenging environment likely to emerge in the next decade. To make any appreciable difference, it must prepare itself now by internationalizing public service attitudes, adapting to the changing role of the state in society and assimilating the new public managerialism which is beginning to take hold in Western countries. Furthermore, it needs to be much less tolerant of public maladministration, it must improve its public relations image, and it should strengthen its commitment to public service. Above all, public managers must take their own professional commitments more seriously and their professional associations must play a bigger role in promoting better performance. But integrating science and practice will be worthless without professional integrity. Otherwise, Public Management 2000 will just follow Business Management 2000 and remain the poor relative doing an inferior job.

Public managers will look back on the 1980s with some nostalgia. Compared with the numerous challenges that will confront them long before the year 2000, the past decade will appear in retrospect to be a rather peaceful period of adjustment. True, they had to cope with a severe crisis in the downturn of public resources, the quest for external funds and internal economies, the demand for privatization and the divestment of state monopolies, and pressure for improved public sector productivity. In some parts of the world they had acute problems of political instability, civil war, insurrection, economic paralysis, foreign intervention and institutionalized corruption.

Those who look to the 1990s for relief have not had much cause for optimism. The new decade did not begin well. Two specific events stood out. One was the collapse of bureaucratic centralism and the disinte-gration of the East Bloc, presenting an ideological challenge to the Left when the ground was virtually cut from under its feet. The other was yet another Middle East crisis threatening world energy reserves, military confrontation and international intervention that changed the rules of the former world order.

Another ominous trend was the corruption revealed in the transaction of public affairs all around the world, ranging from the stock market scandals in the United States and Japan to illegal international trade in narcotics and armaments, from the collapse of unworthy banking houses to the kleptocracy of dictators. These undermined public confidence in public institu0tions and revealed how government and public admini-stration could not be trusted to protect public interests. Managerialism cannot do much against greed. As Scott and Hart conclude⁽³⁾:

Greed appears to be the hallmark of our times, when corporate raiders loot perfectly sound companies or raid government programs for no other reason than that they are there to be looted and raided. ⁽³⁾

All these problems crowd in on public management and make managing the public's business much more difficult and uncertain.

The 1990s will be volatile and no doubt there are more startling events in store as the world heads into the 21st century. Nothing can be taken for granted any more; there are few givens. Only brave or foolish persons can claim to predict the future, and they are likely to be wrong. Like everyone else, they will be caught off guard by any number of surprising and unexpected happenings, beyond current imagination. The only certainty is that the future will not resemble the present; it will not be a mere continuation of the past. Public sector managers more so than their private sector counterparts will just have to be ready for anything, particularly the hidden twists and turns and cope the best they can in the circumstances. But there is a world of difference between facing the future blind and ignorant or aware and wise (or at least clued-in) and perhaps prepared. If they do not start preparing themselves now, they will certainly be unprepared by the year 2000. One thing is clear -- unless public managers take themselves more seriously, their future will be determined largely by others and that usually means following the business route.     

New Public Management in Dutch Local Government

This article investigates the adoption of New Public Management (NPM) in Dutch local government. According to Hood's concept of NPM, it will show the extent to which Dutch municipalities have adopted businesslike instruments and styles. Following Pollitt's framework on studying public management changes, a distinction will be made between changes in ideology, instruments, practices and impacts. The article concludes that, unlike ideological and instrumental innovations, the evidence for NPM-like practices and impacts is limited. To put it crudely, a lot of apparent changes in Dutch local government seem to be only skin-deep.