From Operational Strategy to Serving the Customer: Technology and Ethics in Welfare Law

We previously wrote critically on the UK's welfare computerization programme of the 1980s and in this article we investigate the latest programme. Our argument is that welfare is being seen and is being understood in a technological context rather than a truly welfare one— that is, that the technology behind the computerization projects model views of how welfare recipients should be processed. In the 1980s, the computer model that was being applied was one of data processing (i.e. the 'business model'). In the 2000s, it is the model of computer-based communication (i.e. the 'Internet model'). But further, the new technological communication model is being effused with an ethical aspect— that those who do not communicate are lacking in socio-ethical responsibility to society, and are deemed not to be truly living up to their role as citizens.     

Racist Offenders and the Politics of ‘Hate Crime’

In the UK and USA ‘Hate crime’ has become a topic of public controversy and social mobilization around issues of violence and harassment. This has largely but not exclusively addressed racism, homophobia and gender based violence. This article has three objectives. First, to situate hate crime legislation within a broad theory of modernity;secondly to examine the politics of its emergence as a public issue; thirdly to use data from the authors' recent research in Greater Manchester to illuminate the complexity of the concept of ‘hate crime’. The centrality of ‘hate crime’ to current debates derives from the importance of rights-based regulation of complex societies and the juridical management of emotional life. Hatred and violence have become problematic behaviour thrown into relief by a long term civilizing process. Hate crimes have thus acquired powerful rhetorical focus for mobilization of victim and identity politics. With reference to racist violence in Oldham and elsewhere in Greater Manchester, we argue that in its application and construction, however, ‘hate crime’ is a complex phenomenon that might dramatize rather than regulate the problems it seeks to address. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Explaining high external efficacy in authoritarian countries: a comparison of China and Taiwan

We examine the puzzling phenomenon that authoritarian governments are perceived to be more responsive than democratic governments. By comparing China and Taiwan by both large-N statistical analyses and in-depth case studies, we show that the answer lies in the differences between democratic and authoritarian institutions. First, failing to elect one’s preferred candidate in democracies predisposes voters to critical assessment of government responsiveness. There is no such predisposition in authoritarian countries where elections are nonexistent or nominal. Second, elections incentivize democratic leaders to over-respond to certain groups. There is no such mechanism in authoritarian countries. Third, the solid and clear legitimacy established by electoral victories shield democratic leaders from particularistic demands made through unconventional channels. Without such legitimacy, authoritarian leaders are compelled to cement legitimacy by increasing responsiveness.     

Helping to sort the liars from the truth‐tellers: The gradual revelation of information during investigative interviews

Research examining detection of verbal deception reveals that lay observers generally perform at chance. Yet, in the criminal justice system, laypersons that have not undergone specialist investigative training are frequently called upon to make veracity judgements (e.g., solicitors; magistrates; juries). We sought to improve performance by manipulating the timing of information revelation during investigative interviews. A total of 151 participants played an interactive computer game as either a truth‐teller or a deceiver, and were interviewed afterwards. Game information known to the interviewer was revealed either early, at the end of the interview, or gradually throughout. Subsequently, 30 laypersons individually viewed a random selection of interviews (five deceivers and five truth‐tellers from each condition), and made veracity and confidence judgements. Veracity judgements were most accurate in the gradual condition, p < .001, η² = .97 (above chance), and observers were more confident in those judgements, p < .001, η² = .99. Deceptive interviewees reported the gradual interviews to be the most cognitively demanding, p < .001; η² = .24. Our findings suggest that the detection of verbal deception by non‐expert observers can be enhanced by employing interview techniques that maximize deceivers' cognitive load, while allowing truth‐tellers the opportunity to respond to evidence incrementally.     

A comment on methodological concerns: A rejoinder

This rejoinder to Professor Cohen's Comment is intended to elaborate on approaches we utilized in our original paper. Some of our specification was necessitated by data availability (e.g., the specification of the sanction process). We attempt to clarify our approach in regard to the intervention process. We provide an explanation of the modeling that could underly a test of the hypothesis that the control effect is a product of the arrest process—a test that we had regarded as informative but peripheral to our main points. As noted, a significant part of that test utilizes the full range of control variables available to us. Finally, we enumerate what we felt to be the main points of our paper—points we are afraid might otherwise be lost in this discussion of methodology.