未获支付的卖方对海运货物的留置权

本文分析了记名提单的法律性质 ,指出记名提单也是物权凭证 ,承运人必须凭单放货 ,否则将侵害未获支付的卖方对海运货物的留置权。     

欧洲法律下的提单管辖权条款

本文通过对荷兰法律及有关管辖权和民商事判决执行方面的两个主要公约 (EEX公约和 L ugano公约 )的介绍 ,结合大量的案例和欧共体法院对公约的解释 ,论述了欧洲法律下一个有效的标准格式中的管辖权条款所包含的条件及公约和各国国内法对当事人自由订立的标准格式中的管辖权条款的限制。     

Survival and Accountability: An Analysis of the Empirical Support for "Selectorate Theory"

This study re-examines the empirical support for one of the most influential explanations of leadership tenure, "selectorate theory," by testing for consistency across key regime categories. The argument made herein is that if the measures are good, the consistency of their relationships should not be limited to particular nominal regime categories, and they should capture the implications of the theory differentiating it from competing theories. Current measures of selectorate theory concepts are wanting on both fronts. I find that the measure used for winning coalition size is correlated with the destabilization of leaders in democracies and the stabilization of leaders in nondemocracies. I also find that the measure of selectorate size exhibits two behaviors inconsistent with the theory: larger selectorates are only stabilizing after the leader has already been in office for an extended period of time; and the effect is only substantial for differentiating between types of military regimes. These findings have five implications: (1) they cast serious doubt on the utility of current measures of selectorate theory; (2) they raise conceptual questions about the treatment of political regimes as vectors or categories; (3) they define substantive, not just statistical, issues that future measures will need to address; (4) they give baselines for re-analysis of the effect of these measures on other implications of interest; and (5) they provide an interesting comment on the comparative politics literature on hybrid regimes and the effect of parliamentary institutions in nondemocratic regimes.