Nothing to Lose: An Insurance Company's Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing,Punitive Damages,and The Legacies of Campbell

This article explores the potential evisceration of the deterrence function of punitive damages, one of the only economic incentives that deters insurance companies from opportunistically breaching their insurance policies. Readers will gain an understanding of why large punitive damages awards are essential in the insurance coverage field and how such awards may implicate due process standards. The article explains the constitutional limitations set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in imposing punitive damages, and provides a roadmap of how lower courts and practitioners are presently applying these rules.     

Popular representations of race: the news coverage of BiDil

The BiDil story offers an ideal opportunity to explore the nature and tone of media representations of race and genetics. For example, was a biological view of race emphasized? Or was the notion of race presented in a critical fashion?     

Terrorist Decision Making and the Deterrence Problem

An ongoing debate among policymakers and terrorism scholars concerns the effectiveness of deterrence as a counterterrorism tool. Absent from the debate is a discussion of the complex nature of terrorist decision making. Decisions are made at varying levels in a terrorist organization, often by actors having different motives, resulting in behavior that is not always fully rational. This article identifies several circumstances when terrorist behavior is not the product of an entirely unitary, rational decision-making process, and therefore highlights when deterrence policies will be least effective. It concludes with some policy implications for understanding when deterrence policies are most likely to succeed and how to address terrorism in other situations.     

The case for public‐private partnerships in infrastructure

Abstract: Much of the public debate about public‐private partnerships (P3s) has occurred through the lens of those who either oppose or support this increasingly popular method of delivering public infrastructure assets. Despite some scepticism in the academic literature, an analysis of the key arguments for and against P3s concludes that the P3 model can successfully deliver public infrastructure goods and services, provided that certain key thresholds are met. Lessons learned from early experiments in P3s and from the experience of the newer government P3 procurement agencies suggest that P3s can provide value for money if risk is allocated to the party best able to manage it. An appropriate risk allocation requires that governments have the expertise to identify all of the relevant risks before entering into the partnership contract. Governments must also have the contract management skills to ensure that those risks are in fact borne by the private sector. To maintain public confidence in the P3 model, governments must live up to their own obligations of transparency and accountability and not succumb to private‐sector demands for confidentiality. The article recognizes that not all government goods and services can meet the threshold but that, if they do, it argues strongly for the efficiency and effectiveness of the P3 model. Sommaire: Une grande partie du débat public au sujet des partenariats entre le secteur public et le secteur privé (les P3) a eu lieu par l'entremise de ceux qui opposent ou soutiennent cette méthode de plus en plus populaire de livrer de l'infrastructure publique. En dépit d'un certain scepticisme émanant des documents d'universitaires, une analyse des principaux arguments en faveur des P3 et contre ceux‐ci conclut que les P3 peuvent livrer avec succès des produits et services d'infrastructure publique, à condition que certains seuils clés soient atteints. Les enseignements tirés des premières expériences de P3 et de l'expérience des plus récents organismes d'approvisionnement gouvernementaux P3 laissent entendre que les P3 peuvent apporter une optimisation des ressources si le risque est attribuéà la partie la plus apte à le gérer. Une bonne répartition du risque exige que les gouvernements aient l'expertise pour identifier tous les risques pertinents avant de signer le contrat de partenariat. Les gouvernements doivent aussi avoir les compétences en gestion de contrats nécessaires pour veiller à ce que les risques soient en fait assumés par le secteur privé. Pour maintenir la confiance du public dans le modèle de P3, les gouvernements doivent respecter leurs engagements de transparence et de reddition de comptes et ne pas céder aux exigences du secteur privé concernant la protection des renseignements personnels. L'article reconnaît que tous les produits et services gouvernementaux ne peuvent pas tous atteindre le seuil de conformités mais que, lorsqu'ils y parviennent, le modèle de P3 est alors hautement efficace et efficient.