Intergovernmental cooperation,regulatory agencies and transportation regulation in Canada: the case of Part III of the National Transportation Act

In the National Transportation Act of 1967, provision was made, by means of Part III of the legislation, for the federal government to regulate directly the extra-provincial motor carrier industry. This section has never been implemented and this article attempts to explain why. Such an explanation, it is argued, is important because of the philosophy of the NTA, the responsibilities given to the Canadian Transport Commission and the inadequacies of the existing provincial regulatory systems. The explanation is to be found in an analysis of two factors whose interrelationship has been given inadequate attention. The first factor is the growing recognition of the need for intergovernmental collaboration in transportation planning and regulation. The second is the role of regulatory bodies in the policy process. The argument is advanced that the conflict over implementation of Part in illustrates a number of problems with respect to the appropriate functions of regulatory agencies, particularly in the context of intergovernmental negotiations. The article concludes with the suggestion for a possible course of action that may be applicable to other policy areas. Sommaire. La partie III de la Loi nationale sur les transports de 1967 prévoyait la régulation directe par le gouvernement fédéral de l'industrie du transport extre-provincial par véhicule moteur. Ces dispositions n'ont jamais été mises en application et le présent article tente d'en expliquer les raisons. Une explication s'impose, en effet, en raison de la philosophie même de la loi, des responsabilités qui incombent à la Commission canadienne des transports et des faiblesses de la règlementation provinciale actuelle. L'auteur attribue cette situation à deux facteurs dont l'interdépendance a été sous-estimée. Le premier est celui de la reconnaissance accrue de la nécessité d'une collaboration intergouvernementale pour la planification et la régulation des transports. Le second est le rôle des organismes de regulation dans l'élaboration de la politique en la matière. On suggère que le conflit touchant la mise en application de la Partie in de la loi fait ressorti un certain nombre de problèmes relatifs à la détermination des functions propres des organismes de régulation, particulièrement dans le contexte des négociations intergou-vemnementales. L'article propose en conclusion une ligne de conduite qui pourrait convenir à d'autres secteurs.     

The paradox of grading systems

We distinguish between (i) voting systems in which voters can rank candidates and (ii) those in which they can grade candidates, using two or more grades. In approval voting, voters can assign two grades only—approve (1) or not approve (0)—to candidates. While two grades rule out a discrepancy between the average-grade winners, who receive the highest average grade, and the superior-grade winners, who receive more superior grades in pairwise comparisons (akin to Condorcet winners), more than two grades allow it. We call this discrepancy between the two kinds of winners the paradox of grading systems, which we illustrate with several examples and whose probability we estimate for sincere and strategic voters through a Monte Carlo simulation. We discuss the tradeoff between (i) allowing more than two grades, but risking the paradox, and (ii) precluding the paradox, but restricting voters to two grades.