Characteristics of adolescent incest sexual perpetrators: Preliminary findings

Adolescent incest sexual perpetrators seen at an out-patient clinic were interviewed regarding demographic characteristics and occurrence of deviant and nondeviant sexual behaviors. Results indicate that subjects (1) committed more sexual crimes than they had been arrested for, (2) reported a very early onset of sexual behavior, (3) had additional DSM-III psychiatric disorders, and (4) reported previous sexual victimization. Recommendations for future research are made.     

The law and economics of supranationalism: the European Union and the subsidiarity principle in collective action perspective

This article, prepared for an issue devoted to the work of Judge Richard A. Posner, considers the implications of law and economics for the structure of supranational organizations, with particular attention to the application of collective action theory to the relationships among states in the EU. After discussing the connections between this approach and Judge Posner’s work, the article describes collective action theory and its implications for our understanding of the state and of relationships among states. From this perspective, supranational organizations such as the EU can be understood as institutional structures that facilitate collective action among states by reducing the transactions and enforcement costs of making and implementing collective decisions. At the same time, the delegation of authority to supranational institutions creates agency costs for states and their peoples because the interests of the state and its people diverge from the interests of the collective in some instances. Viewed in this perspective, the institutional structure of the EU—like that of other supranational organizations or federal nation states—reflects an effort to strike a balance between collective decision making and local control so as to maximize the collective gains and minimize the resulting agency costs. Understood in these terms, various features of the EU’s institutional design make sense. The ordinary legislative process permits the EU to act without the unanimous consent of member states, thus reducing transactions costs in those areas where collective action is necessary, particularly in relation to the creation and regulation of the internal market. The EU reduces enforcement costs through principles of direct applicability or effects and the supremacy of EU law, which are effective legal restraints in states governed by the rule of law. The institutional structure of the EU also incorporates a representative and deliberative process for collective action that helps control the resulting agency costs for member states and their peoples through supermajority and co-decisional requirements. The collective action perspective also illuminates the function of the subsidiarity principle and the enhanced role of national parliaments in its enforcement.     

The Economic Evaluation of Policing Activity: An Application of a Hybrid Methodology

This paper advances a hybrid police cost function that synthesises the proactive/preventive and response/reactive methodologies from the criminology literature. The model presents a coherent estimation process that can help in the allocation of scarce resources to police forces and also enable economists, government organisations and criminologists to assess the scale and technical efficiency of forces. This hybrid model uses response survey data for a sample of English and Welsh police forces in which relative efficiency rankings are contrasted with relative performance measures produced by the Audit Commission. We find that there are considerable divergences in police force's scale and technical efficiency during 1997/98 and 1998/99 utilising non-parametric techniques.     

Editorial

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics -