Congress, the Deficit, and Budget Reconciliation

President Clinton's veto of the 1995 reconciliation bill, the largest and most ambitious such legislation ever passed by Congress, was the first time a reconciliation bill was ever rejected by a president. It was also the first reconciliation bill in two decades to include a tax reduction rather than a tax increase. The fate of this bill, and its scope and contents, suggest the need to assess the evolution of reconciliation within the congressional budget process. In the early 1980s, Congress altered budget reconciliation procedures, putting in place a powerful new capability for deficit reduction. Reconciliation became the primary means within the budget process of restraining entitlement spending and increasing taxes as part of congressional efforts to reduce the deficit. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings magnified certain problems Congress encountered in using reconciliation to control entitlements, producing increased pressure to cut discretionary spending. While the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 included new authority to use reconciliation to restrain entitlements, congressional spending priorities combined with the Peace Dividend to maintain the relative sanctuary entitlement programs have enjoyed. The limits of reconciliation as a deficit reduction tool, both in terms of increasing revenues and curtailing entitlements, are detailed. The inherent procedural advantages accorded to entitlements are contrasted with the treatment of discretionary programs, explaining in part the widening gulf between these two categories of spending. Congress has attempted, without success, to find alternatives to reconciliation. The failure of the seven-year, deficit-eliminating reconciliation bill of 1995 may indicate that certain Limits on the use of reconciliation may have been reached.     

(Non)equivalence in a federalism: Dual tax shares, flypaper effects and Leviathan

Among the best-known theorems of fiscal federalism is the presumed allocative and distributive equivalence between a lump-sum grant to a collectivity and a set of lump sum grants to the members of a collectivity. Interestingly, the simple elegance of the theorem is at odds with observed behavior. Grants to governments produce greater public spending than does tax reduction. Explanations of this "flypaper effect" range from misspecified econometric modeling to presumed behavior based on fiscal illusion. In this paper we show that theoretical equivalence exists in a model that recognizes only one tax share, the citizen voter's local tax share. When the model is expanded to include voters' federal tax shares as well as local taxes, non-equivalence and the flypaper effect become the rule, not the exception.     

Pigou, Coase, common law, and environmental policy: Implications of the calculation debate

The implications of the calculation debate are explored for Pigouvian, Coasean, and common-law liability approaches to externality problems. There is no escaping Hayekian-Misean information problems, but the institutional setting within which environmental policies are resolved affects the domain of third-party calculation. The calculation required is likely to be significantly less under common-law arrangements than under administrative processes. The primary implication for environmental policy is that increased reliance on competitive market processes and the common law in copying with externality problems may be more effective than attempts to improve current administrative approaches.     

Friends in high places: The wealth effects of JFK's assassination on the assets of LBJ's supporters

This paper uses anecdotal evidence to identify a group of firms that had significant ties to President Lyndon Johnson and determines the effect of Johnson's unexpected rise to the Presidency on the market value of these firms. The unexpected nature of President Kennedy's death eliminates the confounding event problem typically associated with election results. We are able to identify four separate portfolios of firms that had political ties to Lyndon Johnson. Our research suggests that the market expected significant benefits to accrue to these firms as a result of Johnson's becoming President. When Catholic John Kennedy and Johnson were running together in 1960 a joke hop-scotched around the parties in Texas and Washington that Kennedy had told Johnson, “Lyndon, when we get elected I'm going to dig a tunnel to the Vatican,” and Lyndon had replied, “That's OK with me as long as Brown & Root gets the contract” (Dugger, 1982: 286).     

Just Social Policy on Life Issues: Ethical Considerations

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." These words from the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence, proclaimed a conviction and announced a challenge for our newly formed nation. Today, they either stir the American heart with pride or generate nostalgia for a time when any truth was self-evident and the right to life was deemed inalienable.     

Economics and distributive ethics

This essay, adapted from his Inaugural Lecture as the Simon Professor at Lafayette, was dedicated to the memory of Aaron Wildavsky.