Reaching for profit in the welfare state: Patrimonial economic voting in Denmark

Economic voting has been well-studied in a number of advanced industrial democracies, including Denmark. However, that work has been almost entirely on the valence dimension, i.e., rewarding or punishing government according to whether the overall economy prospers. Recent work has looked at other economic voting dimensions, including patrimony, i.e., the impact of property ownership on the vote. A patrimonial effect has been found in the UK, the US, and France. However, it seems to differ somewhat depending on the welfare-character of the state, with the US at one end and France at the other. Here we examine patrimonial economic voting in a still more extreme welfare state - Denmark. In our analysis of voting in the 2011 parliamentary election, we establish two new findings: 1. patrimonial economic voting exists in Denmark and, 2. its effect is stronger than that for other countries studied thus far.     

The Kramer problem: Micro-macro resolution with a Danish pool

In a seminal paper, Kramer (1983) posed his “problem” for the study of economic voting with election surveys: the items administered can measure neither individual nor national economic wellbeing accurately. Instead these items of economic perception are laden with erroneous judgment and partisan bias. Thus, the investigation of economics and elections should not be a survey research enterprise. Here we show, through varied analyses in an extensive, well-gathered Danish election pool, that these fears are unfounded. The presence of strong sociotropic voting effects from surveys can be established, and reconciled with the observed effects of national fluctuations in the macro economy. Indeed, the micro- and macro- processes mirror each other, so resolving the Kramer problem.     

Explaining the distribution of State funds for national road investments between counties in Norway: Engineering standards or vote trading?

Road investment planning in Norway is officially based on cost-benefit analyses, but the results of such analyses have been shown to have little impact on policy. This paper analyses the distribution of state investment funds for national roads between counties in Norway, trying to find a rational choice explanation of the departure of road investment policy from cost-benefit considerations. Three models are proposed to explain the distribution of investment funds between counties: (1) the highway sufficiency rating model, (2) the net economic benefit model and (3) the vote trading model. Analyses for 1990–93 and 1994–97 investment planning terms support the highway sufficiency rating model and the vote trading model. The net economic benefit model is not supported. The highway sufficiency rating model and the vote trading model are highly correlated, making their relative explanatory contributions impossible to identify.     

The Application of Game-Theory in the Study of Hierarchical Decision-Making*

The article discusses hierarchical decision-making within a rational-choice framework. The interaction between Superior and Subordinate is assumed to be influenced by three types of uncertainty regarding preferences, choice and ‘what happened’. A game-theoretical analysis indicates that the Control Game may represent the decision situation of the superior and the subordinate actors, particularly when modelled as a one-shot game with simultaneous moves. As this game has no Nash-equilibrium, it is difficult to predict an outcome. A rather tentative empirical testing is performed. Using data from the budgetary process in the city of Oslo, it seems that the agencies do not exploit strategic opportunities to increase spending. This supports the theoretical presumption that it is rational bureaucratic self-interest to comply with superior preferences, even under a non-controlled decision situation.     

Embedded rubber sandals: trade and gifts across the Sino–Kyrgyz border

How does a group of Uyghur traders from a village in Atush (Xinjiang, China) end up with a stock of unsellable rubber sandals in Kadamjay (Batken, Kyrgyzstan), and why don’t they compete according to market principles? This article explores the social investments of the traders and their families, and reveals their behaviour to be rational, both economically and socially. It illuminates the business and daily life of Uyghur traders in southern Kyrgyzstan, an environment that is increasingly challenging and uncertain. The examination of exchange relations between their households explains why the traders cooperate as they do and also why they do not cooperate more. Economic rationales and social obligations prove to be mutually embedded. This insight expands and deepens a nascent analytical approach that recognizes social motivation for economic activities in Central Asia alongside undeniable economic incentives. This approach has much to gain from being more explicitly reconnected to classical anthropological theories of gift giving.     

Macro-economic decision-making in Norway: an analysis of economic decisions within the politico-economic framework

Summary. The aim of the study is to analyze when and why Norwegian governments carry out expansive decisions rather than contractive ones. Following the politico-economic approach, it is proposed that both the governmental re-election prospects and economic indicators may influence macro-economic decision making.
The article attempts to employ this framework in an empirical analysis of events data, i.e. in an analysis of 318 decision events spread throughout the period from 1964 to 1984. Unemployment is the major determinant of macro-economic policies. The hypothesis of political business-cycle receives only limited empirical support, and there is little reliable evidence of socialist governments responding differently to economic and political factors compared to borgeois governments.     

Aggregating Spending Preferences: An Empirical Analysis of Party Preferences in Norwegian Local Governments

To understand the role of political parties in public budgetmaking, we need separate data about spending preferences andbudgetary outcomes. In this paper we employ such data todiscriminate between different models of how competing partypreferences are transformed into policy outcomes. In the firststep of the analysis data on politicians' spending preferencesare used to estimate the desired allocation of each party. Inthe second step the desired allocations are used as inputs ina separate analysis of the decision-making process inNorwegian local councils.