Reshaping the Democratic State: Swedish Experiences in a Comparative Perspective

In the international discourse concerning recent administrative reform developments there is a dominant overall interpretation propagated by a dominant story-teller: the public management programme (PUMA) of the OECD. This article takes issue with this story, arguing that instead of a singular pattern of adaptation there have been and there are several different reform trajectories in Western-style democracies, largely predicated on historically determined patterns of state-society relations and significant variations in political cultures. A detailed comparative analysis of the case of Sweden is here used to illustrate the prevalence of a pattern of 'structured pluralism' and the fruitfulness of a historical-institutionalist approach to the comparative study of administrative reform.     

Values and value tradeoffs in higher education policy

Public policies represent tradeoffs between values. Policy analysts should see one of their main tasks as identifying the nature of such tradeoffs, both as a general phenomenon and as they vary between specific policy areas. In this article five basic values of higher education are identified: equality, excellence, autonomy, accountability and efficiency. Their occurrence in Swedish higher education is analyzed, as well as the specific tradeoffs arrived at within the framework of that policy.I am grateful to Professor Burton Clark of the University of California at Los Angeles for providing me with the opportunity to write this article.     

Coping with Budget Deficits in Sweden

During the late 1970s and early 1980s Sweden's budget deficits grew more rapidly than in probably any other country of Western Europe. Government policy responses developed in three phases. In the late 1970s there was very little action taken to cope with run-away deficits. From 1980 to 1982 a strategy was formulated and partly implemented which heavily emphasized austerity measures through expenditure cuts. From late 1982 a 'mixed' strategy has been pursued which combines less drastic cuts with selected revenue increases. The virtual lack of response in the late 1970s and the turn-about in 1980 may be explained by reference to four major categories of factors: the severity and longevity of the economic crisis itself and the prevailing interpretations of its root causes; the dynamics of public sector growth and the understanding of the processes involved; the ideological and policy predispositions prevalent among policy-makers, economists, major interest groups and the public at large; and, finally, a set of 'organizational' factors mainly associated with the parliamentary situation in Sweden.     

Competitive Tendering in the Welfare State: Perceptions and Preferences among Local Politicians

Competitive tendering for public services has triggered a heated academic debate. In political economy, competition is claimed to improve efficiency. If this is true, why are most governments faithful to the monopoly model? Political economists suggest that public sector employees and unions influence the preferences of the elected politicians. In new institutional theory, competition is claimed to undermine democratic governance. If this is true, why do some elected governments make use of competitive tendering? In this tradition, organisational solutions are seen as expressions of autonomous values and perceptions about the outcomes of organisational solutions – not as manifestations of vote–maximising politicians subject to self–interested interest groups. When governments use competition, it is due to misconceived management fads that have temporarily penetrated long–established perceptions and value systems. These propositions have not been subjected to proper empirical testing. We have analysed extensive data about Norwegian local politicians, and found support for the notion that the perceptions of elected politicians affect their preferences for tendering for residential care services for elderly people and hospital services. But we found support for the political economy propositions as well. Party affiliation, interest group background and economic situation influence the perceptions and organisational preferences of elected politicians. Reform may be a question of political values and perceived consequences, but these values, perceptions and policy preferences are influenced by political self–interest and can be changed by exogenous economic shocks.     

Taking Sides? Issues of Bias and Partisanship When Researching Socio-political Conflict

The article unpacks the issues of bias and partisanship—and the risk of being accused of these—which confront social scientists who study socio-political conflict. Drawing on the author’s experience when conducting research on the conflict between animal liberation activists and their state and corporate adversaries in Britain (1999–2014), the article argues for a relational research approach—focusing on the interaction between contending parties, rather than study stakeholders singly—as a way to overcome challenges of taking sides when studying socio-political conflict. The debate generated by Howard Becker’s classic essay “Whose side are we on?” (1967), now 50 years old, is used throughout the article as a point of reference for addressing the issues involved. The argument is made for constant reflexivity during research on radical social movements, and for “temporary bias” during qualitative fieldwork.     

Between spin doctor and information provider: Conceptualizing communication professionals in government ministries

Communication professionals are increasingly found within government ministries. Based on classic work on bureaucracy and recent literature on mediatization and personalization, this article develops two ideal types: the government information provider and government spin doctor. These ideals are constituted by six dimensions: recruitment criteria, values, loyalties, reputational concerns, interactions, and tasks. A study of nonpartisan communication professionals in Norwegian ministries is used to illustrate the empirical relevance of the ideal types. The analysis shows that for loyalties and reputational concerns, Norwegian communication professionals resemble the government information provider. Regarding interactions and tasks, they resemble the government spin doctor. For recruitment criteria and values, the picture is mixed. The empirical application thereby illustrates a fruitful aspect of the framework as certain configurations will bring forth inbuilt tension in communication professionals' role. The framework allows a fine-grained approach to extend ongoing debates of appropriate and inappropriate practices of communication professionals in ministries.     

Customizing a commercial laboratory information management system for a forensic genetic laboratory

The need for high-throughput laboratories to comply with regulatory requirements makes data management an important aspect of forensic genetics. A Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS) enables efficient workflows and ensures traceability if designed and implemented properly. We customized a commercial LIMS to support STR typing of reference samples according to in-house defined requirements. The customization focused on data validity, traceability and automated solutions.     

Automated extraction of DNA and PCR setup using a Tecan Freedom EVO liquid handler

We have implemented and validated automated methods for DNA extraction and PCR setup developed for a Tecan Freedom EVO^® liquid handler mounted with a Te-MagS™ magnetic separation device. The DNA was extracted using the Qiagen MagAttract^® DNA Mini M48 kit. The DNA was amplified using AmpF?STR^® Identifiler^®, Y-filer^® (Applied Biosystems), GenePrint^® FFFL and PowerPlex^® Y (Promega). The methods were validated for fresh whole blood and blood from deceased according to EN/ISO 17025.     

Geographical redistribution with disproportional representation: a politico-economic model of Norwegian road projects

Politicians bias public policies to favor particular election districts. According to the traditional common pool model, districts facing low tax shares should receive relatively large government projects. We suggest a swing-voter model where the number of voters on the ideological cut point, lack of party identification and number of district representatives per voter determine project sizes. We analyze the allocation of state road investments in Norway from 1973–1997 exploiting unique data on characteristics of voters, legislative representation and tax prices in 19 election districts. Geographical representation to parliament is biased, mostly due to an ancient constitution. Shares of swing voters and legislative over-representation lead to higher levels of road investments, while high levels of party identification reduce investments.     

Do voters learn? Evidence that voters respond accurately to changes in political parties’ policy positions

A premise of the mass–elite linkage at the heart of representative democracy is that voters notice changes in political parties’ policy positions and update their party perceptions accordingly. However, recent studies question the ability of voters accurately to perceive changes in parties’ positions. The study advances this literature with a two-wave panel survey design that measured voters’ perception of party positions before and after a major policy shift by parties in the government coalition in Denmark 2011–2013. Two key findings extend previous work. First, voters do indeed pay attention to parties when they visibly change policy position. Second, voters update their perceptions of the party positions much more accurately than would have been expected if they merely relied on a ‘coalition heuristic’ as a rule-of-thumb. These findings imply that under some conditions voters are better able to make meaningful political choices than previous work suggests.