Digital Inclusion for Persons with Disabilities in China Under COVID-19: How Far Has China Come?

This article reviews social regulatory and redistributive policies in China that aim at fostering digital inclusion of persons with disabilities. We examine the emerging Chinese policies and how China has responded to the impacts of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) on digital inclusion in terms of redistribution, market regulation, involvement of persons with disabilities and disabled people’s organizations (DPOs), and awareness-raising campaigns. The policy review demonstrates that the Chinese policy framework contains a few redistributive initiatives, for example, cash transfer programs, and free distribution of information and communications technology (ICT). These have the potential to increase the uptake of ICT among persons with disabilities. The Chinese policy framework also includes provisions to ensure consultation with individual persons with disabilities and DPOs in the deliberation and implementation of ICT accessibility policies. While China has initiated awareness-raising campaigns among market actors about the importance of digital inclusion, so far, the Chinese government has adopted little legal regulation of the market to foster accessibility to ICT. The article thus argues that some of the limitations may be due to the way state–market relations have developed since the economy opened up in 1978. Apart from the growing benefits of several cash transfer programs, we have not seen major changes or adjustments to the current policy framework during the efforts to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on digital inclusion.     

What Are the Sources of Political Parties’ Issue Ownership? Testing Four Explanations at the Individual Level

Political parties’ issue ownership—their perceived competence in handling issues and problems—is a major ingredient explaining voting behavior. Yet, our understanding of the sources of issue ownership is limited. This study is the first to bring together and evaluate four different explanations of voters’ perceptions of parties’ issue ownership: partisanship, attitudes, perceived real-world developments, and constituency-based ownership. Using novel measures implemented in a national survey, we show that all four sources exert independent, if varying, influences on voters’ issue ownership perceptions. Even though voters’ partisanship tends to dominate issue ownership perceptions, attitudes and performance evaluations also matter. Moreover, the hitherto mostly neglected constituency based component of ownership has a substantial, independent influence on ownership perceptions. These findings indicate that issue ownership is more than merely an expression of partisanship and attitudes.     

Public Employees as Swing Voters: Empirical Evidence on Opposition to Public Reform

Reform offers economic gains for society atlarge, but can represent a threat to theinterests of public employees. Publicsector reform faces opposition from votersemployed in public sector. Norwegian dataallow for an analysis this interpretation.Survey data show that public employeesprefer less reform than the rest of thepopulation. The voting behavior of publicemployees is more sensitive to reform thanis that of other voters (the swing voterhypothesis), and hence: shares of publicemployees in a local jurisdiction have anegative impact on the probability ofreform.     

Political competition,party polarization,and government performance

Lack of party competition may impair government efficiency. If the voters are ideologically predisposed to cast their votes in favor of one political party, they may reelect an underperforming incumbent. Party polarization may magnify this effect since the median voter faces a higher cost of selecting a better, but ideologically distant incumbent. Alternatively, if the electorate is evenly divided between parties, polarization may induce parties to invest more effort in improving their election prospects. The current paper analyzes efficiency in Norwegian local governments. Efficiency has been measured by means of panel data on government service output over a 10-year period. Electoral dominance has been measured as number of elections wherein one party bloc receives at least 60 % of the votes, measured over six consecutive elections. Party polarization is defined as the ideological distance between the two party blocs, and it is measured on basis of survey data on the ideological preferences of elected politicians. Lack of party competition reduces efficiency, the effect being stronger in governments where more party polarization exists. These agency losses are larger in high-revenue municipalities.     

Occupational culture as determinant of knowledge sharing and performance in police investigations

Police investigation units represent a knowledge-intensive and time-critical environment. Knowledge sharing is a key process in investigations. In this paper, we present an empirical study of performance in police investigations. Police investigation units are defined as value shops, where primary detective work is performed. Knowledge sharing is found to have a significant influence on the police investigation value shop. Furthermore, this research suggests that knowledge sharing is influenced by occupational culture. Occupational culture is a reduced, selective, and task-based version of organizational culture that is shaped by the socially relevant worlds of policing occupation. Four dimensions of occupational culture were identified: team culture, planning culture, theoretical culture, and traditional culture. Only the extent of team culture was found to have a significant influence on the extent of knowledge sharing and performance in police investigations.     

Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

Abstract Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.     

Assessing the Influence of Political Parties on Public Opinion: The Challenge from Pretreatment Effects

Despite generations of research, political scientists have trouble pinpointing the influence of political parties on public opinion. Recently, scholars have made headway in exploring whether parties in fact shape policy preferences by relying on experimental designs. Yet, the evidence from this work is mixed. I argue that the typical experiment faces a design problem that likely minimizes the extent to which parties apparently matter. Because parties have policy reputations, experimental participants may already know from real-world exposure to political debate where the parties stand before they are told in the experiment—they are “pretreated.” This study investigates how real-world political context interferes with party cue stimulus in experiments. In two experiments I show that two types of “pretreatment” from outside the experiment—exposure-based and reputation-based—dramatically moderate the effects of party cues in experiments. Moreover, the politically aware participants—who are most likely to have been pretreated before entering the experiment—are the most sensitive to this interference from real-world context. Paradoxically, experimenters are most likely to find no effect of parties at the very time that their influence is strongest outside the experiment. These findings emphasize the importance of keeping real-world context in mind when designing and analyzing experiments on political communication effects and might help reconcile disparate results of previous party cue experiments.