Does Canadian Multiculturalism Survive through State Repression?

Emma Ambrose and Cas Mudde argued in this journal that the absence of far-right parties in Canada can be attributed, among other factors, to “strong state repression of dissent” on multiculturalism policy. This article provides numerous examples of such dissent, to show that the state repression invoked by Ambrose and Mudde does not exist. The article also argues that certain “supply-side” explanations for the absence of a strong far-right apply to the Canadian case. It notes, in particular, how Steven Harper's Conservative government occupied much of the political space that might otherwise have been available for far-right challengers.     

An expressive voting model of anger,hatred, harm and shame

To consider some political implications of angry voters, we alter the standard expressive model in a fundamental way. One result is that an angry voter with a strong sense of shame at the thought of voting to harm others, may still do so, even when the harm is brutal. Indeed, his willingness to vote for harming others may increase if the proposed harm becomes more severe, even though the angry voter is more “decent” (less willing to harm others) than most of us sometimes are. Several examples are given that are consistent with the most troubling implications of the model. An empirical appendix follows the concluding section which tests the implications of the model indirectly.     

National Human Rights Institutions: Domestic implementation of international human rights law

Does adopting a National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) make states’ international commitments to not torture more constraining? Many researchers have explored international human rights treaties’ abilities to constrain leaders from violating human rights, some focusing exclusively on the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). Thus far, findings are not promising unless certain domestic conditions apply such as sufficient democratic space to air grievances or independent judiciaries. This article continues to explore domestic conditions by focusing on another liberal institution—National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs). Torture is usually a secretive practice, and NHRIs act as information providers to potential mobilizers and domestic legal systems assuring international legal commitments are not empty promises. Using statistical analysis on 153 countries over the years 1981–2007, I find that when a country has ratified the CAT, the presence of an NHRI substantively decreases the chances the state will be an egregious offender.