排序方式: 共有65条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
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SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON ANWAR IBRAHIM SHEIKH SAUD NASSER AL‐SABBAH MOHAMAD MAHATHIR MOHAMAD KHATAMI MASOUMEH EBTEKAR ABDULLAHI AHMED AN'NA'IM HASSAN AL‐TURABI GABER ASFOUR MICHAEL M. J. FISCHER NILÜFER GÖLE MARTIN MARTY FARIDA FAOUZIA CHARFI LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI MUNAWAR AHMED ANEES DANIEL J. BOORSTIN RYSZARD KAPUSCINSKI IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN JEAN DANIEL REGIS DEBRAY MAHMOUD HUSSEIN TAHAR BEN JELLOUN KANAN MAKIYA 《新观察季刊》2008,25(1):14-17
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Ümit Berkman 《国际公共行政管理杂志》2013,36(6):1345-1368
Public bureaucracies carry a potential for bribery. This paper tries to identify and examine the factors affecting the potential or the probability of bribery. It is argued that the specific nature and the probability of bribery depend on the persons involved, the corrupt act in question, the organization in which the event takes place and finally the socio cultural, economic and political environment with in which the organization operates. 相似文献
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JEHANGIR POCHA HA JIN WOLE SOYINKA ORHAN PAMUK VALÉRY GISCARD D'ESTAING SONIA GANDHI ABUDURRAHMAN WAHI JOSE RAMOS‐HORTA SHARIF ALI BIN AL HUSSEIN PETER BOUCKAERT WESLEY CLARK RICHARD HOLBROOKE BOUTROS BOUTROS‐GHALI SCOTT RITTER ROLF EKEUS LULA DA SILVA SEBASTIAN EDWARDS ALVARO VARGAS LLOSA BILL CLINTON RICHARD PERLE JOSEPH ROTBLAT GÜNTER GRASS BORIS BEREZOVSKY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH SHIMON PERES 《新观察季刊》2008,25(1):28-31
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This article asks under which conditions the state‐building efforts of external actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities. International efforts need to resonate with prevalent social norms. To substantiate this argument, we focus on the European Union's (EU) anticorruption programs and their implementation in one of the most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that legitimacy can explain why the EU's fight against corruption helped reduce corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites could selectively use anticorruption programs as an instrument against political opponents, using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent regime. Only in Georgia, however, was the fight against corruption facilitated by sustained domestic mobilization for anticorruption policies that added pressure on political elites “from below.” 相似文献
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Conclusion Mandate, as a noun, is the charge that authorizes and legitimizes an intervenor's actions. The intervenor may act at the bidding of the disputants or of third party stakeholders. Mandate provides a functional taxonomy of intervenors—from go-betweens to conciliators to mediators to arbitrators to dictators. Mandate affords a perspective for analyzing initiation, process, and evaluation of intervention. Useful heuristics have been proposed for categorizing the ways in which intervenors restricted to persuasion, such as mediators, can attempt to change beliefs. Future work might seek to determine conditions under which an intervenor's persuasive abilities may change beliefs about available alternatives, about the probability that the alternative will lead to certain outcomes, and about the value of the outcome.
Sanda Kaufman is Assistant Professor of Urban Studies at the College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio 44115.George T. Duncan is Professor of Statistics at the School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Penn. 15213.The authors thank Mark Kamlet for many valuable discussions, Linda Argote for her thoughtful suggestions, and Christina Duncan for her criticial reading. 相似文献
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