China and the “Responsibilities” of a “Responsible” Power—The Uncertainties of Appropriate Power Rise Language

This article looks at the ambiguities and tensions for and around the People's Republic of China (PRC) in being “responsible” (fuzeren) and having “responsibilities” (zeren), both of which are related consequences surrounding its growing power (guo) in the international system and in the Asia-Pacific. However, the ambiguities surrounding the implications of being “responsible” and of having “responsibilities” cause problems not only for the international system but also for the PRC in terms of its image, and others' reaction to the PRC. International and regional stability will be shaped by how far these aspects of power rise settle down in the PRC's interaction and presence in the international system and in the Asia-Pacific.     

J. Covarubbias and T. Lansford (Eds.), Strategic Interests and the Middle East: Opposition or Support for U.S. Foreign Policy

ABSTRACT

The United States was at least partly culpable for the failure of denuclearisation agreements with North Korea concluded during the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in the 1990s and early 2000s. American failure to implement commitments in a timely manner arose from a combination of domestic and presidential politics, the constraints imposed by international partnerships, and bureaucratic structures and procedures. For its part, North Korea implemented its commitments faithfully until its leadership’s increasing disenchantment with American tardiness and perceived lack of good faith.     

Regional push: Towards a geography of development and growth in lowand middle-income countries

Regional push derives from the geographic agglomeration of economic activities, and is expressed in increments to national productivity. Various pieces of statistical evidence in favour of the existence of regional push effects in low- and middle-income economies are marshalled. The origins of these effects in different sorts of externalities and increasing returns to agglomerative scale and scope are analysed in theoretical terms. Further evidence for the existence of these effects is displayed in a brief review of published case studies of African, Asian, and Latin American regions. A number of observations are then offered on the possibilities of identifying viable developmental policies and practices directed to enhancing the productivity-boosting properties of regions in low- and middle-income economies.     

THE CIA'S SECRET POWERS

The secret powers conferred by the National Security Act of 1947 have been used over the years to train, arms, and develop the terrorist enemies, such as al-Qaida, that are now the chief justification for those powers in the public mind. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, CIA programs have shifted power from moderate to Islamist Muslim groups, contributed to vastly increased heroin production in the area, and helped consolidate the ISI as Pakistan's drug-financed intelligence agency a “state within a state” that has promoted both al-Qaida and terrorism in other areas such as Kashmir. The secret powers, by preventing rational discussion, have spawned disastrous policy decisions that even the CIA itself has opposed, notably the decision to supply Stingers to the Afghan rebels. The most conspicuous deep political consequence of these policies in Pakistan and Afghanistan has been the indirect training and arming of cadres who eventually participated in the specific events of 9/11: the culmination of a series of terrorist attacks against the territorial United States for which the CIA itself had already, in 1998, secretly admitted partial responsibility. This responsibility is reflected in the present inability of the U.S. government and media to report honestly on what actually happened in the 9/11 attacks.