Mandibular ramus height as an indicator of human infant age

There were two goals to be achieved from the analysis of 53 skeletonized infants from the Southwest Collection at the National Museum of Natural History. The first objective was to determine whether this infant sample could be aged based on a mandibular measurement. The second was to determine which dimension of the mandible, if any, most accurately predicts infant age within a six-month range. Seven osteometric measurements were applied to each mandible. Statistical analysis determined that the individuals in the Smithsonian's Southwest Collection that were under two-years-old could be accurately aged to within six months. Out of these seven measurements the most accurate age-at-death estimates were generated based on the maximum height of the mandibular ramus. This finding can potentially aid investigators in determining the age-at-death of infants.     

Protecting genetic materials and genetic information: a case study of Guthrie Cards in Victoria

The authors are privileged to have been provided with correspondence about a dispute over the ongoing storage of genetic material (as Guthrie Cards) in Victoria. The correspondence details confusion over the roles of government and the private sector service provider in accounting for the storage, use and destruction of these stored genetic materials collected as part of a government public health program. The purpose in publishing this account is to highlight the present inadequacies in current practices and the ongoing potential for a crisis in the management of collected genetic materials through a lack of appropriate regulation, transparency and accountability. The article suggests measures to remedy some of the existing inadequacies in contractual arrangements and recommends that the government retain ownership and control of both the genetic materials and the derived information to ensure some accountability in the present legal environment.     

Preventing Prevention

Preventing climate change and damage from natural disasters typically requires policies with up‐front costs that promise a flow of benefits over time. Why has obtaining such policies in a competitive electoral democracy proved so intractable? We develop a formal model of electoral accountability in this context, in which politicians have private information about their motivations. The model shows why fully rational voters, though certain that incumbents spend less on disaster prevention than is good for them, reelect incumbents at very high rates. In addition, in such equilibria, voters would punish incumbents who spent more on disaster prevention. This equilibrium is consistent with (and implies) some of the major empirical regularities observed in the literature on voting and disaster prevention. We discuss some implications of our analysis for advancing public debates about disaster and climate change mitigation.