When are similar regimes more likely to form alliances? Institutions and ideologies in the post-communist world

Following the collapse of the old communist regimes, 28 post-communist countries chose from among three main foreign security arrangements: commonwealth of independent states (CIS)/collective security treaty organization (CSTO) membership, north atlantic treaty organization (NATO) membership, or neutrality. What explains these choices? We are most interested theoretically in the role played by regime type. The alliances literature typically uses a narrow institutional theory of the effects of regime type, which implies that more democratic regimes are more attractive alliance partners than more authoritarian regimes. Post-communist area specialists will be aware that this institutional theory fails to explain the apparent tendency of more authoritarian post-communist regimes to join the CIS/CSTO. We develop a broader ideological theory of how regime type affects alliances, in which political institutions are complemented by substantive ideological and policy goals. Applying the ideological approach to the post-communist world, we define and measure two main ideological regime types – liberal nationalist regimes and neo-communist authoritarian regimes. Multinomial logit regressions indicate that more democratic, liberal nationalist regimes are more likely to affiliate with NATO, whereas more authoritarian, neo-communist regimes are more likely to join the CIS/CSTO. Moreover, the desire of neo-communist authoritarianism regimes to affiliate with the CIS/CSTO is as strong or stronger than that of neo-liberal democracies to affiliate with NATO – largely because NATO is more reluctant than Russia to accept aspirants. We conclude that the ideological approach to regime type may offer significant explanatory value as a refinement of the institutional approach.     

Fair is Fine, but More is Better: Limits to Inequity Aversion in the Domestic Dog

Research with domestic dogs provides a unique approach for exploring the evolution of fairness and justice. Not only are dogs descended from highly social canids; they have also been bred for cooperative tasks with humans. Dogs act cooperatively in social play and are skilled on other social cognitive tasks. It is reasonable to ask whether dogs behave in ways similar to primates in other social contexts. In particular, do dogs perceive and respond to unfairness or injustice, a skill potentially borne of long-term affiliation with and selection by humans? Using a revised test of inequity aversion which looks at advantageous and disadvantageous inequity, the current research investigated the behavior of 38 domestic dogs. Subject dogs and a control dog approached two trainers in turn: one who rewarded them equally for sitting on command and one who rewarded them unequally??either over-rewarding or under-rewarding the control dog. After familiarization with the trainers, subjects chose which trainer to approach by themselves. Subjects preferred the over-rewarding trainer over the fair trainer; they had no preference between the under-rewarding and the fair trainer. Further analyses found that length of ownership, subjects?? age, and cooperative work experience reversed the approach preference, predicting preference for the fair trainer??though breed did not. These results suggest that the precursory sensitivity, which dogs showed to iniquitous outcomes in prior research, does not extend to both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity and does not hold when the subject is continually rewarded. Dogs selected a trainer who had treated them ??unfairly,?? yet who presented a potentially greater opportunity for future rewards. When the stakes were high, dogs showed a greater sensitivity to the quantity of a reward than to the fairness of a reward.     

Cause and consequence in public policy theory: Ethnic policy and system transformation in Malaysia

Considering public policy as both a dependent and an independent variable, this article undertakes a systematic assessment of the sources and systemic consequences of policy. It begins with a statement of contrasting theories of the sources of policy. One strand of comparative theory emphasizes national cultures and elite beliefs as the main sources of policy; another stresses the cross-national imperatives of particular policy programs, of international diffusion, and of common policy processes. Drawing on longitudinal data on an array of ethnic policies in Malaysia, the study highlights the limits of cultural-determinist theories of policy. It shows that elite beliefs change over time, often creating layers of policy based on varying premises; that one set of beliefs can overcome another, inconsistent set; that critical events can alter the balance of authoritative beliefs; and that, where beliefs are in conflict, organized interests have room for maneuver. Moreover, the interaction of a mix of operative beliefs can produce outcomes very much at variance with what policymakers wish or anticipate. Finally, on the systemic effects of policy, the study shows that interests created by earlier policy can be decisive actors in the shaping of later policy. Policy itself can change the entire structure of the political system - an outcome rather clearly demonstrated in the case of Malaysia.     

Structural Sources of Post-Communist Market Reform: Economic Structure, Political Culture, and War

Why did some post-communist countries implement more thorough market reforms than others? Four different structural explanations are considered: (1) relative size of economic interest group coalitions hurt by market reform; (2) predominant religious traditions, which may incorporate norms and institutions more or less favorable to market reform; (3) variation in historically based national economic and political expectations, in which greater pre-communist political and economic achievements may create collective rationales for more aggressive institutional and policy reforms; and (4) duration of large-scale military conflict, which may distract and undermine reformist governments. These explanations are tested both directly, and mediated through plausible process predictors—democratization, party ideological moderation or extremism, strength of the presidency, and party system concentration. The 28 post-communist countries are examined over shorter and longer time spans—2 years after the fall of the old regime and a decade or so after the fall. The two political culture variables—predominant religious tradition and national economic and political expectations—provide the most statistically significant and powerful predictors. War is also a significant and powerful predictor. Relative size of economic interest group coalitions is estimated to have little impact. Among the process variables, democratization and party ideological moderation have the most consistently significant and powerful impacts. One implication is that middle-range theories of political culture, which can be more firmly grounded in rational calculation and historical context, may be a promising way to remedy the weaknesses of political culture theories operating at the broader level of religion or civilization.