Decreeing organizational change: judicial supervision of public institutions.

In the last fifteen years or so, courts have issued a small but significant number of decrees requiring that governmental bodies reorganize themselves so that their behavior will comport with certain legal standards. Such decrees, addressed to school systems, prison and mental hospital officials, welfare administrators, and public housing authorities, insert trial courts in the ongoing business of public administration. In this article, Professor Horowitz traces the origins, characteristics, and consequences of organizational change decrees. He finds their roots in an unusually fluid and indeterminate system of procedural forms and legal rules, a system hospitable to the impact of changing ideas about the performance of bureaucracy and the role of courts. He explores the problematic character of organizational change litigation, underscoring the ways in which organizational behaviour is fraught with a variety of informal relationships beyond the contemplation of the courts. In Professor Horowitz 's judgment, efforts to augment the capacity of courts to cope more effectively with organizational change litigation may redound to the disadvantage of the judicial process by emphasizing the new managerial role of the courts at the expense of their traditional moral function. He concludes by suggesting that capricious budgetary ramifications, unintended consequences, and the impact of unconventional enforcement practices on the courts themselves be included among the elements of a full evaluation of organizational change litigation.     

Where have all the parties gone? Fraenkel and Grofman on the alternative vote – yet again

The alternative vote (AV) is a preferential electoral system that tends to reward political moderation and compromise. Fraenkel and Grofman (2004, 2006a, 2006b) have repeatedly attempted to show that AV is not conducive to interethnic moderation in severely divided societies. In this response to their latest attempt, I point out that neither political party coordination of the vote nor strategic voting plays any part in their analysis. In contrast, I explain how moderate parties of one ethnic group are able to induce their supporters to cast ballots for moderate parties supported by voters of another ethnic group. I also explain why the incentives for parties to arrange interethnic vote transfers are much greater under AV than they are under systems such as the single transferable vote, which is in use in Northern Ireland, and I show that Fraenkel and Grofman”s interpretations of AV’s operation in Australia, Fiji, Sri Lanka, and Papua-New Guinea are contrary to the evidence.