Revolution,longevity and legitimacy in communist states

This article examines key linkages in the dramatic turn of events in totalitarian states by reviewing the literature on regime legitimacy and longevity in communist regimes. But that longevity is a poor substitute for legitimacy. Eastern Europe states, where communist rule was externally imposed, were relatively “easy” to overcome. However, changes occurring in countries where quasi-legitimacy was achieved by mass movements, as in China or the Soviet Union; and those under family dictatorships, such as North Korea and Cuba, are not as subject to collapse. These pseudo forms of legitimacy resist liberalization in political terms, although economic changes are increasingly feasible as a half-way house. Still it is now clear that longevity in and of itself is not a substitute for legitimacy. The former is a function of time, the latter of social structure. This paper was written and accepted for publication in the wake of events following the collapse of communist power in most states of Eastern Europe during 1989. It does not cover the events which led to the collapse of communist power in the Soviet Union during 1991. Rather than simply adjust the paper to reflect current events, I take this opportunity to simply note the time frame during which the paper was produced. Indeed, I would also note that the Russian Revolution of 1991 served to delegitimize communist power by the exposure and then collapse of the coup attempt orchestrated by the KGB, a sector of the military elite and the upper stratum of the Communist Politburo. Such delegitimation accelerated a process of communist disintegration that could have taken a much longer period of time, and with possibly a different set of outcomes. [ILH] Irving Louis Horowitz is Hannah Arendt distinguished professor of sociology and political science at Rutgers University. He has written widely on developmental subjects, includingThree Worlds of Development (1965);Equity, Income, and Policy: Comparative Studies in Three Worlds of Development (1977); andBeyond Empire and Revolution (1982); all published by Oxford University Press.     

Informing Jurors of Their Nullification Power: A Route to a Just Verdict or Judicial Chaos?

The current studies sought to test whether explicitly informing jurors of their power to nullify the law does invite chaos, defined by jurists as undisciplined and biased juror judgment. A series of four studies examined juror biases predicated on defendant status, remorse, gender, national origin, penalty severity, and extenuating circumstances. None, however, were amplified by nullification instructions, providing little evidence that such instructions invite chaos with respect to the biases examined in these studies. To the contrary, several results suggested that nullification instructions simply encourage jurors to nullify when the strict application of the law would result in an unjust verdict. Limitations of the studies and public policy issues are discussed.     

Targeting Civilians in Ethno-Territorial Wars: Power- and Preference-Based Sources of Ethnic Cleansing and Mass Killing Strategies

In internal ethno-territorial conflicts, what explains why state or rebel group leaderships use civilian-targeting strategies—expulsion or mass killing strategies designed to punish enemy civilians or to decimate the enemy civilian presence on contested territory? One argument is that those living under the worst initial conditions—defined in terms of collective goods such as weak collective autonomy, policy outcomes, and material conditions—are most likely to target enemy group civilians. Another approach focuses on relative power—arguing that the enemy civilian population is targeted either because of weaker or stronger relative power. A third approach argues that differences in leadership preferences—in particular, more ideologically extreme or power-seeking preferences—are likely to drive direct assaults on enemy civilians. We examine these proposed mechanisms in terms of expected effects on benefits and costs in a simple ethno-territorial bargaining framework. We argue that relative power advantages and more extreme nationalist preferences seem most likely to predict decisions to target enemy civilian populations. We expect strongly power-seeking preferences to lead to civilian targeting more conditionally—where there is a greater internal political threat along with either greater relative power or a more moderate enemy. Last, we do not expect that variation in initial conditions will have a significant direct effect. We apply the framework to explain patterns of civilian targeting following the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991.

[Supplementary material is available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism for the following free supplemental resource: online appendix.]     

What Determines Military Victory? Testing the Modern System

This paper assesses the relative importance of force employment as a cause of military victory. It focuses on the adoption of the modern system in interstate wars since 1917. Using cases, contingency tables, and regression analysis, we find that war participants who use the modern system are significantly more likely to succeed in decisive battlefield engagements. However, the modern system does not predict victory at a higher rate than more traditional unit-level explanations for combat effectiveness, suggesting that it might function as a causal mechanism linking factors like regime type and material endowments with martial capabilities. Exploring the possible links between unit-level explanations of military power and the organizational-level force employment indicators, we find that more materially powerful states and democracies tend to implement the modern system at a higher rate than other types of actors, but more extreme autocracies also frequently adopt. Combined, these findings suggest the relevance of continuing to explore how organizational-level variables impact military effectiveness.