The Changing Structure of Opportunity: Recruitment and Careers in Large Law Firms

Growth and bureaucratization have begun to transform patterns of recruitment and career development in large law firms. Based on a case study of four large Chicago firms, this article examines these changes and their implications. The findings indicate that the social composition of large firms has become substantially more heterogeneous with respect to the status of law school attended, gender, and ethnoreligious background. However, data on lawyers' careers suggest that associates entering firms today face an increasingly bureaucratic organizational context marked by higher levels of turnover, earlier and more intensive specialization, decreased levels of client responsibility, and more frequent assignment to large-scale litigation. The article also addresses the dynamics of individual choice over type of work performed in firms. Lawyers initially working in litigation fields are far more likely to change fields of practice than are lawyers who begin in office practice fields, reflecting the increased tendency for firms to assign new associates to litigation as well as the alienating propensity of large-firm litigation for many associates. Paradoxically, a greater proportion of lawyers in traditionally organized, general service firms than in bureaucratically organized, specialty firms report that their choice of work was dictated by the firm. Also, somewhat surprisingly, the frequency with which firms explicitly direct lawyers into particular fields has not increased from earlier periods. The article concludes that these anomalies result from the fact that firms control the career choices of lawyers, and always have, but that the way such control is exercised varies across firms and historical periods.     

Private Representation in Washington: Surveying the Structure of Influence

Despite the significance of interest representation to theories of law and politics, the social organization of interest representation has not received systematic empirical analysis. Based on interviews with 776 individuals engaged in the representation of private interests concerning national policies on agriculture, energy, health, and labor, this article reports some findings concerning the social and political characteristics of representatives, the nature of their work and their relationships with client organizations. Three models of the social organization of interest representation are developed and examined: a model based on substantive expertise, an institutional targets model, and a client-based model. The findings indicate that representation is predominately organized around client interests Although lawyers constitute a significant and distinctive group among representatives, they are neither as numerous nor as active in policy making as is commonly assumed. The analysis suggests that representatives are not likely to exercise influence in the policy-making process that is autonomous from client organizations.     

Police patrol and the deterrence of crime

A nonrecursive model of the deterrent effect of police presence was formulated and tested for 26 cities. Victimization data were employed as measures of crime, unpublished FBI data on the number of police patrol units as the measure of levels of police presence, and data for 11 exogenous variables were derived from FBI and census reports. It was found that per capita, police are a positive function of rates of violent crime and that clearance rates are a positive function of police presence. However, some offenses that have traditionally been thought to be deterrable are not inversely related to clearance rates. The equations were re-estimated using official measures of crime and found to be more consistent with the deterrent hypothesis. It is suggested that official data may generate a spurious correlation. Finally, caution is suggested in consideration of alternative forms of police presence.     

Metaphor and Imagination in James Wilson's Theory of Federal Union

"Through metaphor, the past has the capacity to imagine us, and we it." -Cynthia Ozick, in "The Moral Necessity of Metaphor"
American federalism is nothing more-und nothing less-than a metaphor.
This was how lames Wilson, the most prominent lawyer at the Philadelphia Convention, came to approach the novel problem of understanding and conveying what federalism in a modern republic should mean. The Federal Republic created in 1787 was, for Wilson, more than a mutter of ingenious political design, more than a mutter of the "new science of politics," and more than a mutter of constitutional law or constitutionalism itself-unless the Constitution were seen to "comprehend" the moral purpose and moral promise of the new nation.
To Wilson, this view of the importance of the moral content of republican federalism was entailed by the "knowledge" that he took to be the necessary foundation of the Republic. It was this knowledge of certain fundamental principles- of "moral science,'I human nature, and the nature of language, and, more generally, of "cultivation" us a political and social process that was also an end in itself-that ultimately justified "the People" us the "sublime" metaphor governing American constitutional theory.
Yet, for all Wilson's faith in figurative "comprehensiveness," his distinctive approach to securing the New Republic through a federal union of the American People seems to have proved less and less compelling to his contemporaries the more he tried to pursue it as far us his vision of a politics of cultivation directed.