A New Method of Assessing Judicial Workload in Juvenile Dependency Cases

This article describes a new method for calculating judicial workload in dependency or child abuse and neglect cases. In contrast to traditional judicial workload methods, the method described herein produces estimates of judicial workload that take into account the complex role of the juvenile dependency court judge—a role that includes both on‐ and off‐the‐bench activities. The method provides workload estimates that give guidance to courts not only about the minimally sufficient judicial resources needed to accommodate current caseload needs, but also what level of judicial resources would be required to hold substantive dependency court hearings that comport with nationally recognized practice recommendations. The article reviews commonly used judicial workload methods, outlines the new method, and uses a pilot of the method as an example of how the method works in practice. Broader implications of this workload method are also discussed.     

The terms of trade and real import capacity of the tourism sector in Tanzania

The paper argues that in the nineteen‐seventies, international tourism in underdeveloped countries is liable to have experienced the following: (a) a lower rate of growth of price; (b) a decline in the terms of trade for the sector; (c) a lower rate of growth in the real import capacity of the sector. These hypotheses are demonstrated for an area of holiday tourism, and for tourism in general, in Tanzania up to the end of 1976. Reference is made to the part played by the depreciation of the currency against the separate currencies of the major tourism markets.     

Responding to terrorism across the technological spectrum

The ‘revolution in military affairs’ arguably heralds a new era of warfare dominated by the American military's mastery of the conventional battlefield. This ‘revolution’, however, will have little if any impact on American military capabilities so far as countering terrorism, insurgency, or guerrilla warfare are concerned. With regard to terrorism specifically, a combination of the resurgence of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative and the implications that it has to trigger acts future of mass, indiscriminate violence; the proliferation of ‘amateur’ terrorist groups which may contribute to the loosening of previous self‐imposed constraints on operations and lethality, and the growing sophistication of established, more ‘professional’ groups is likely to lead to higher levels of lethality and destruction than in the past.     

Anglo–American Relations 1950–51: Three Strikes for British Prestige

In 1949–1950, Britain rejected ideas of being a third force between the post-war Superpowers and adopted instead an approach that has been the keystone of British foreign policy from that point onwards: “hugging America close.” The aspiration was to establish a position closely related to the United States yet sufficiently independent, effectively to harness American power to British ends. This now familiar position has been much-debated recently in the context of post-9/11 military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan especially. However, this analysis examines three crises immediately following the British decision in 1949–1950 to give priority to the Anglo–American “special relationship” to demonstrate that, for Britain, this policy from the onset was both advantageous and potentially difficult. The outcomes of crises over NATO's Atlantic Command, Iranian oil, and ANZUS demonstrate how expansion of United States influence benefitted Britain but sometimes also required painful British adjustment and loss of prestige.     

Creating stability in the New Europe: The OSCE high commissioner on national minorities and the socialization of risky states

In “Protecting ‘The Prize': Oil and the U.S. National Interest,” Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press present an important counterargument to many common but overwrought worries about energy security. Yet they themselves go too far in the opposite direction. Gholz and Press argue that only three types of potential oil market disruptions could induce “particularly painful” adjustments and hence rise to the highest level: consolidation of a large fraction of Persian Gulf reserves under a single power, domestic instability in Saudi Arabia, and blockage of the Strait of Hormuz. I argue in this response that Gholz and Press confine the second and third scenarios too narrowly, and hence understate the security risks stemming from U.S. dependence on oil.