Toward the privatization of the CIS weapons industry: The ‘collectivist’ option

The Russian military-industrial sector, like the economy generally is undergoing a turbulent transformation. Property rights, institutional arrangements, regulatory mechanisms and procurement demand are in rapid flux. In 1992 weapons production declined drastically, variously estimated between 20 and 67 percent, but arms contracts for 1993 are reported to be double last year's volume. This essay attempts to illuminate key elements of Russia's military-industrial transition by analyzing how property rights, tax and regulatory reforms of the sorts advocated by Alexsandr Isaev and Anatoly Chubais are apt to effect efficiency and military-industrial conversion. It is shown that while collectivist ownership could enhance economic efficiency, despite the usual Ward-Domar effects, Yeltsin's market reforms may not be sufficient to foster large scale military-industrial conversion.     

The effect of temporary residences on burglary: A test of criminal opportunity theory

Previous work testing the criminal opportunity/routine activities theory of burglary has been marked by three recurrent problems: (1) a neglect of testing the theory in rural areas (2) the use of indicators which confound opportunity with disorganization effects (3) failure to control for alternative theories of burglary. The present paper contributes to the literature by correcting these shortcomings. The results of a multiple regression analysis of county level data from Michigan indicate that the greater the criminal opportunity, the greater the rate of burglary. These results are independent of indicators taken from economic strain and social disorganization theories. The model explains 69% of the variance in burglary rates overall and 84% of the variance in rural counties. While there may be higher levels of social cohesion and lower anonymity in rural areas, these factors are not sufficient to offset the influence of criminal opportunity.     

Efficacy,power and equity under approval voting

Approval voting allows each voter to vote for as many candidates as he wishes in a multicandidate election. Previous studies show that approval voting compares favorably with other practicable election systems. The present study examines the extent to which votes for different numbers of candidates can affect the outcome. It also considers generic powers of voters and the extent to which approval voting treats voters equitably. If there are three candidates, votes for one or two candidates are equally efficacious in large electorates. For four or more candidates, votes for about half the candidates are most efficacious. Although inequities among voters can arise under approval voting, the common plurality voting system is considerably less equitable than approval voting.