Frustration effects in procedural justice research: The case of drug-testing legislation

A scenario methodology was used to investigate reactions to negative outcomes resulting from drug-testing procedures. The drug-testing procedures reflected variations in State law governing the use of drug tests in employee selection. Results suggest that individuals responded most negatively to negative outcomes resulting from the legally mandated procedures. Results are discussed as an example of the frustration effect observed in the procedural justice literature. Frustration effects were most severe for individuals who were most certain, based on personal knowledge, that the drug test results were inaccurate.     

Public Protests, Private Lawsuits, and the Market: The Investor Response to the McLibel Case

The tendency of English libel law to protect reputation at the expense of freedom of expression makes the United Kingdom a potentially attractive forum for retaliatory lawsuits against individuals and organizations who lobby or campaign against the interests of large companies. The most prominent recent example of such a lawsuit was the so-called 'McLibel' case, in which McDonald's Corporation sued protesters who had distributed anti-McDonald's leaflets outside some of the company's restaurants. The case is often cited as evidence that the risk of unfavourable publicity generated by retaliatory libel actions is a strong deterrent to using the libel laws to silence public opposition to corporate activities. This article uses a technique widely employed in financial economics research, the 'event study' method, to investigate whether the unanticipated bad publicity attracted by the McLibel case had a negative financial impact on McDonald's, such that future retaliatory lawsuits might be deterred.     

Limiting Party Representation: Evidence from a Small Parliamentary Chamber

Parties are seen as vital for the maintenance of parliamentary government and as necessary intermediaries between voters and legislators; an elected parliamentary chamber not controlled by parties is highly anomalous. This study contrasts the party‐controlled Tasmanian lower house with its Independent‐dominated elected upper house and finds that the major source of constraints on party representation is not a clientelistic style of politics but the persistence of a distinctive institutional design and electoral rules based on fixed terms and annual staggered elections. The consequences of these rules are explored for their effects on voter choice and legislative behaviour.