Shot by the Messenger: Partisan Cues and Public Opinion Regarding National Security and War

Research has shown that messages of intra-party harmony tend to be ignored by the news media, while internal disputes, especially within the governing party, generally receive prominent coverage. We examine how messages of party conflict and cooperation affect public opinion regarding national security, as well as whether and how the reputations of media outlets matter. We develop a typology of partisan messages in the news, determining their likely effects based on the characteristics of the speaker, listener, news outlet, and message content. We hypothesize that criticism of a Republican president by his fellow partisan elites should be exceptionally damaging (especially on a conservative media outlet), while opposition party praise of the president should be the most helpful (especially on a liberal outlet). We test our hypotheses through an experiment and a national survey on attitudes regarding the Iraq War. The results show that credible communication (i.e., “costly” rhetoric harmful to a party) is more influential than “cheap talk” in moving public opinion. Ironically, news media outlets perceived as ideologically hostile can actually enhance the credibility of certain messages relative to “friendly” news sources.

Corporate social responsibility in the European Union: a new trade barrier?

• This paper contributes to the discussion about Corporate social responsibility (CSR), competitiveness and trade policies, and how trade barriers emerge between countries already committed to CSR and those for whom CSR is still gaining ground. The authors describe the development of CSR within Europe and explain its role in shaping trade relationships. Gaining access to the European market, and obtaining the ‘licence to operate’ in light of strengthening commitment to CSR, is an issue for many companies. For countries outside the EU it is important to understand what CSR means in the European context and to recognize its implications for conducting business in the region. Further, through its economic power and resources, the EU sets standards and influences international trade norms. The authors conclude that the EU establishes CSR as a trade barrier for non‐complying companies in the terms of organizational culture, communication, capabilities and compliance.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Forgotten Pirates: Iraqi and Iranian Pirates in the Arabian Gulf Who Have Never Been Reported to the International Maritime Bureau

If piracy attacks are unreported, a misleading impression is given of piracy situations in regions where there could be serious consequences for ships traveling in waterways on the assumption that they are piracy-free waters. However, sometimes not reporting piracy attacks could help to contain piracy before it expands, because reporting can lead to the media over-focusing on piratical incidents, and armed guards being deployed on ships, which causes pirates to use heavier arms and escalates the level of conflict. Piracy that took place during 2003–2012 in the north and the center of the Arabian Gulf has never been reported to the International Maritime Bureau. The present article examines this case of unreporting, and discusses its causes and consequences.     

Acute and sub-acute paraquat poisoning in a pack of foxhounds

A case of paraquat poisoning in a pack of foxhounds is reported. The incident provided a unique opportunity to compare residues levels of paraquat in dogs showing symptoms of acute and sub-acute poisoning. Paraquat was detected in the urine up to six days after exposure. A high performance liquid chromatography method for determining paraquat in tissue is described.     

Multilevel blame games: Blame‐shifting in the European Union

Who blames whom in multilevel blame games? Existing research focuses either on policymakers' preferences or their opportunities offered by the institutional structures in which policymakers operate. As these two strands of literature barely refer to each other, in this article we develop an integrated theoretical model of blame‐shifting in multilevel governance systems and assess it empirically. In line with the first strand, we assume that policymakers have a preference for shifting blame onto actors on a different level from themselves. In line with the second, we suppose that opportunities for doing so depend on institutional responsibility for policymaking and policy implementation. We check the plausibility of our integrated model by examining policymakers' blame attributions in three cases where European Union migration policies have been contested: border control, asylum, and welfare entitlements. We find that our integrated model does better in explaining blame‐shifting in these cases than the isolated models.