The Anti‐Collusion Toolkit: Limits of a Policy that Combats the Facilitation of Collusion

This paper identifies key obstacles of law enforcement that may frustrate a policy that fights the facilitation of collusion. It outlines remedial actions against features that facilitate collusion and examines to what extent authorities––such as Directorate General (DG) for Competition, National Competition Authorities and regulators––have the powers and ability to take these actions. The analysis covers a number of legal tools including the theory of harm of coordinated effects in European merger control, Articles 101 and 102 Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union, stricter national laws and regulation. I conclude that DG Competition has little powers to act, except for merger control. Although NCAs and regulators may enjoy broader powers, tough challenges lie ahead in terms of the exercise of discretion, error and effectiveness of remedial actions.     

Goodbye van Gend en Loos,Hello Bosman? Using Network Analysis to Measure the Importance of Individual CJEU Judgments

It is generally agreed that some judgments by the Court of Justice are more important than others, but the ability of traditional legal methods to identify such judgments is inherently limited. In this article, we apply various tools developed in network analysis to identify which judgments are the most important as legal precedents. The study reveals that certain well‐known judgments, like van Gend en Loos, have limited importance as precedents, while other judgments, like Bosman, PreussenElektra and Schumacker, are likely overlooked.     

作品的解构

<正>Lorsqu'apparaít un nouveau nom en littérature,la prudence voudrait qu'on laisse agir le temps pour en appréhender,si ce n'est la pérennité,du moins le sens et les effets sur