Hizbullah Terrorism Finance: Fund-Raising and Money-Laundering

Hizbullah, which has been designated a terrorist entity in several international jurisdictions, depends upon a substantial mobilization of financial resources to support its complex, multi-faceted organizational apparatus, its domestic activities in Lebanon, and its far-reaching transnational operations. This study surveys Hizbullah's resourcing requirements, and examines the role of military assistance from Iran and Syria along with Hizbullah's own reliance on front organizations, clandestine networks, business enterprises, propaganda media, and local exactions to generate funding for operational activities. Particular attention is directed at the diversion of charitable contributions, the exploitation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), involvement in criminal activities and contraband trade, and the money laundering mechanisms utilized to transfer funds to where they are required. It also reviews efforts by international authorities to staunch the flow of financial resources to terror groups, activities and operations, including their effect on Hizbullah terrorism finance.     

Terror and the Liberal Conscience: Political Fiction and Jihad—The Novel Response to 9/11

After the attacks on the World Trade Center and Washington, D.C. in 2001 the Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication devised a new classification. The category, September 11 Terrorist Attacks 2001-Fiction, responds to a distinct genre of political novels. In the light of the philosopher Richard Rorty's contention that the Western novel can clarify the moral and political options that confront the West, the article examines what insight, if any, into the motive for violence, and the capacity to recuperate a sense of liberal progressive purpose, the novels of 11 September afford?     

Party,Politics and Deciding What Is Proper: Army Officers’ Attitudes after Two Long Wars

Drawing on recent research, the author shows how a majority of officers still believe that the active duty military should not criticize civilian leaders publicly. However, fewer today think this way than those surveyed in the late-1990s. This is a surprising finding given the poisoned state of civil-military relations towards the end of the Clinton Administration, but perhaps is indicative of the Army's frustrated experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade.     

Military Alliances in the 21 Century: Still Relevant after all These Years?

While military alliances have always been important to the United States, some experts wonder about their future. In today's uncertain security environment, they question whether these alliances may have outlived their usefulness. The author argues that U.S. national security leaders face some difficult choices as they formulate strategy and determine the number and types of collective security arrangements the nation will require to secure its national interests in the future.     

Military Dialogue in the Euro‐Mediterranean Charter: An Unjustified Absence

The summer 2006 war in Lebanon can be perceived through at least five different frames of reference. The US administration saw the war in Lebanon as a local manifestation of the global war on terror. According to this framework, Hezbollah is an Al Qaeda-type enemy, not a national group with a local agenda and constituency; bargaining with Hezbollah is not possible. This point of view makes fighting global terror more difficult and jeopardises the search for stability and peace in the region. Many Israeli and European politicians saw the war as a confrontation between radical Islam and a modern Israeli state, a clash of cultures between Islamic fundamentalists and Western civilisation. This frame of reference, however, fails to recognise the fault line within the Muslim world itself, between those who want to integrate their societies into a globalised world and those who do not. The conflict in Lebanon can also be interpreted as a consequence of the weakening of a state, a framework which underlines the need to strengthen Arab institutions, or as an asymmetrical war between an armed nation state and a guerrilla movement. Finally, the war in Lebanon can be seen as a conflict over power, land, resources and sovereignty–the classic realist perspective. If the international community fails to work toward a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, another framework will gain strength in the Arab world: one that interprets events according to a theory of non-negotiable conflicts between Western imperialism and radical Islamic resistance.     

Book reviews

John R. Davis, Britain and the German Zollverein, 1848–66 (London: Macmillan, 1997). x + 238 pp. £45. ISBN 0–333–67828–1.

Martin Thomas, Britain, France and Appeasement: Anglo‐French Relations in the Popular Front Era (Oxford and New York: Berg. 1996). xi + 268 pp. £29.95 hb; £12.95 pb. ISBN 1–85973–192–9.

Peter Lowe, Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies Towards Japan, China and Korea, 1948–53 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997). xii + 288 pp. £40. ISBN 0–7190–2508–7.

David M. Barrett, Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1994). xii + 279 pp. £11.95 pb. ISBN 0–7006–0631–9.

Rhodri Jeffreys‐Jones, Changing Differences: Women and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy, 1917–1994 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997). x + 275 pp. £14.50 pb. ISBN 0–8135–2449–0.

Philip M. Taylor, Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media Since 1945 (London &; New York: Routledge, 1997). xx + 248 pp. £45 hb. ISBN 0–415–11678–3; £15.99 pb. ISBN 0–415–11679–1     

Appeasement in the Late Third Republic

This article considers whether a specifically French ‘appeasement’ developed among policymakers of the inter-war years and, if so, how various appeasement strategies changed over time. It does so firstly, by attempting to define this French version of appeasement partly by reference to the historiography of French inter-war foreign policy and strategic planning. The article then considers the various impersonal forces that led to changes of course in foreign policy. These include domestic social and political pressures, economic conditions, and the changing strategic balance of power in Europe. The article suggests that French appeasement was neither a constant feature of France's international strategy in the 1930s nor simply a mirror image of its British counterpart. The foundations of French diplomacy, military thinking and strategic outlook were altogether different. By the late 1930s the limitations of actual allies, the recalcitrance of some potential friends, the elusiveness of others, had all provided a powerful fillip to proponents of appeasement, although substantial minorities continued to oppose it. Ultimately, France without a great power ally was a nation compelled to appease.