The concept of desert and its influence on simulated decision makers' sentencing decisions

The concept of desert (the principle that punishment should be made proportional to the severity of the crime committed) is introduced against its philosophical and legal background. Discussion focuses on the role of desert in contemporary sentencing reform proposals and the relationship between desert and other goals of legal punishment. Previous empirical research has addressed a between-offense conception of desert and suggests proportionality does control individuals' responses to crimes differing in severity. Our research focuses on the operation of desert within offenses (or the balance of harm done and punishment deserved for the individual offender) within the context of crimes of increasing severity. Six experimental simulations varied the relativity of victim/offender suffering prior to sentencing. Results show that for a minor crime punishment is an inverse monotonic function of offender suffering, but for crimes of moderate and high severity only excessive offender suffering successfully mitigated punishment. The source of offender suffering made no difference, supporting earlier work by Kalven and Zeisel; suffering exerted no effect on conviction decisions. Overall results are viewed as demonstrating the influence of both within-and between-offense conceptions of desert and the importance of the symbolic and moral blame components of legal punishment.Work on this research was supported by a Russell Sage Foundation Law and Social Science Residency Fellowship awarded to the author. This paper is based in part on a paper delivered at the American Psychology-Law Society meetings, Chicago (1975). The author would like to thank Mary Kristine Utne, V. Lee Hamilton, and an anonymous reviewer for their many helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

US Policy and the Nuclear Weapons Ambitions of the “Axis of Evil” Countries*

This article examines US policy as it pertains to the nuclear weapons objectives of what the Bush administration identified as the countries making up the “axis of evil,” pre-war Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Having drawn the same conclusion as that appearing in the 2000 report of the Project for the New American Century, which alleged the involvement of these countries in illicit activities relating to nuclear weapons, the Bush administration initiated an overtly hostile and accusatory policy toward each of these nations after 9/11.Undeterred by the paucity of evidence and the failure to find a nuclear weapons program (or any weapons of mass destruction) in Iraq, the Bush administration has remained relentlessly focused on the nuclear weapons ambitions of North Korea and Iran, all the while ignoring or minimizing diplomatic efforts that are not hegemonic and confrontational. This paper stresses that for the past several years the Bush administration has not hesitated in using questionable and uncertain information relating to the nuclear weapons objectives of the “axis of evil” countries, even though it has demonstrated no interest in eliminating US nuclear weapons as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligates it to do.     

Privacy and the regulation of 2012

This paper explores the European Commission’s proposal for a new Regulation to update and reform data protection law in Europe. As regards the Regulation itself, without presenting an exhaustive analysis of all the provisions, this paper aims to highlight some significant changes proposed to the data protection regime by comparison between Directive 95/46 and the proposed Regulation. It takes particularly into account legislative innovation concerning data protection principles, data subjects’ rights, data controllers and data processors obligations, and the regulation of technologies. Before analyzing these innovations, it introduces some considerations about the Commission’s choice to use a Regulation instead of a Directive to harmonize national data protection regime.     

Understanding chester I. Barnard

Chester I. Barnard is an example of a manager-participant-observer whose concepts and theories have a major impact on managerial thought and practice in both the public and private sectors.

I am greatly honored to be here and to participate in the first meeting of the Chester I. Barnard Society (U.S.A.). It seems only fitting that we make every effort to bring Barnard, the man, and Barnard's thinking to public attention. In this modern age where computers and rapidly advancing technology seem to be dominating our world, we need to find focus and balance in dealing with the eternal paradoxes and conflicts of a managerial society. Chester I. Barnard more than any other person in the field of management provides perspective for this challenge.

Accordingly, I wish to discuss my perception of Chester I. Barnard and some of the key concepts found in his philosophy and his theory of management. However, before doing so I wish to summarize comments about Chester I. Barnard by a few outstanding persons. These will serve to give a feel for the breadth of Barnard's activities and the significance of his work.

Barnard's thinking has been praised by outstanding men of science. Many see in the work of Herbert Simon, the Nobel Prize recipient, a significant shadow of Barnard. In Simon's book, Administrative Behavior, a number of ideas are traceable to Barnard: composite decision processes, bounded rationality, opportunism in decision processes, and so forth. Simon himself states that “The Functions of the Executive [Barnard's major publication]⁽¹⁾ was a major influence upon my thinking about administration.⁽²⁾ The eminent economist, Kenneth Boulding, states in his book, The Image, that one of the books which influenced him the most is the “pioneering work of Chester I. Barnard.”⁽³⁾

The famous American philosopher, John Dewey, stated: “In the main I believe the great value of Barnard's discussion is that it is one of those rare cases in which a man of affairs, an experienced executive, also has genuine intellectual curiosity and wisdom.”⁽⁴⁾

Bertrand de Jeuvenel, the distinguished French political scientist, wrote to Barnard: “Your thinking is political philosophy of the highest order...As one speaks of Keynesian revolution in economics, I feel one should speak of a Barnardian revolution in political science.”⁽⁵⁾

Fortune Magazine,one of the renown American business periodicals, states:

Chester I. Barnard possibly possesses the most capacious intellect of any business executive in the U.S.⁽⁶⁾