Treating alcohol-related violence: a feasibility study of a randomized controlled trial in prisons

Purpose: There is a lack of good-quality outcome evaluations of interventions for offenders whose crimes are alcohol-related. Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are considered gold standard in treatment evaluations. Here, we report on a feasibility study for an RCT of an alcohol-related violence intervention, Control of Violence for Angry, Impulsive Drinkers (COVAID). Method: 115 adult male prisoners were randomly allocated to COVAID plus treatment as usual (TAU) or TAU only. Results: Most participants (84%) found COVAID useful. Reconviction data at six months were accessed for 109 (95%) participants. There were no differences between the two groups on violent reconvictions or all reconvictions at the six-month period, but at 17?months the COVAID group had 13% fewer people reconvicted for violence, and 20% fewer had reconvictions for any offence. Conclusion: The results indicate that an RCT is feasible and provides parameters for designing a full RCT. Differences in reconviction between groups favoured COVAID and were clinically important.     

Taking Responsibility for Negligence and Non-negligence

Negligence reminds us that we often do and cause things unawares, occasionally with grave results. Given the lack of foresight and intention, some authors argue that people should not be judged culpable for negligence. This paper offers a contrasting view. It argues that gaining control (over our agency, over a risky world) is itself a fundamental responsibility, with both collective and individual elements. The paper underlines both sides, focussing on how they relate as we ascribe responsibility or culpability. Following the introduction, Section 2 (“Culpability and Control: The Negligence Sceptics”) argues that conscious awareness is neither necessary nor sufficient for control. Control is not a property of deliberate choice, so much as a practical achievement. Section 3 (“Non-negligence as a Shared Task”) stresses the collective aspects of non-negligence: creating knowledge about risks, structuring environments to guard against them, and developing standards of care. Failings in the collective task, rather than lack of individual control, mean it can often be unfair to pin culpability on a single individual. Section 4 (“Culpability for Negligence Revisited”) suggests that a basic duty of a responsible person is to acknowledge the ways in which we may do more or less than we mean to, often in ways that create risks. It then sketches an approach to culpability as part of a collective exercise: as we take responsibility for standards of care, and for our own and others’ agency.

     

Drugs,law, people,place and the state: ongoing regulation,resistance and change

We introduce this special issue firstly by tracing drugs from their traditional, cultural and religious uses through to their roles as commodities in colonial relations and now the global economy. We secondly explore the shifting nature of drugs and drug use in different places and times as shaped by politics, especially state regulation and the law. Thirdly, given the complexity as well as contingency of drugs, we survey a wide range of relevant theoretical approaches, but suggest that a critical analysis attend to their spatial framing and geography. Fourthly, and finally, we summarize the eight papers comprising this collection.     

The Philosophy of the Gift and the Psychology of Advocacy: Critical Reflections on Forensic Mental Health Intervention

This article examines mental health advocacy,exploring the philosophy of the gift and thepsychology of forensic intervention. Byselectively, though strategically, reviewing the workof Hobbes, Emerson, and Nietzsche,we argue that egoism, charity, and pity displace altruistic, selfless gift-giving. To furtherlegitimize our analysis, we consider Derrida's semiotic deconstructionism and Lacan's psychoanalytic semiotics. Derrida points outhow gift-giving is an aporetic reality; that is,it represents an (im)possibility. Lacandemonstrates how the mirror stage of development givesrise to the self-other ego, in which the subjectis always and already divided. We subsequentlyexplain, therefore, how the gift of mental healthadvocacy must necessarily proceed, in part, from self-interests (i.e., egoism), making the virtuousact of mental health advocacy an (im)possibility.