EVALUATION OF POLICE SERVICES IN MEDIUM-SIZED CITIES

Citizen evaluations of police services in four medium-sized cities are investigated in this article. Socioeconomic characteristics as well as police attitudes and political attitudes were found not to be good predictors of citizen evaluation. Complaint efficacy was found to be the best predictor of citizen satisfaction with police services.     

An axiomated family of power indices for simple n-person games

In this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, a new family of power indices based on the notions of minimal winning coalitions and equal division of pay offs is developed. The family of indices is parameterized by allowing minimal winning coalitions to form in accordance with varying probability functions. These indices are axiomatically characterized and compared to other similarly characterized indices. Additionally, a dual family of minimal blocking coalition indices and their characterization axioms is presented.     

Exploring the Origins of the American Administrative State: Recent Writings on the Ambiguous Legacy of Alexander Hamilton

Books reviewed:
Arnold A. Rogow, A Fatal Friendship: Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr.
John Steele Gordon, Hamilton's Blessing: The Extraordinary Life and Times of Our National Debt.
Peter McNamara, Political Economy and Statesmanship: Smith, Hamilton, and the Foundation of the Commercial Republic.     

Bureaucratic incentives, path dependence, and foreign aid: An empirical institutional analysis of irrigation in the Philippines

At least 25 developing countries are embarking on irrigation governance reforms to address the persistent problem of poor irrigation performance. Some scholars suggest that the patterns of construction, deterioration, rehabilitation, and modernization commonly found among irrigation agencies in these countries are rational because of the time inconsistency problem of information. I argue instead, using panel data from the Philippines, that the problem of poor performance is linked to inherent incentive problems faced by public bureaucracies, how these incentives became entrenched in the path dependence of irrigation development, and how these were reinforced by incentives embedded in irrigation aid, particularly by the moral hazard problem and the fungibility of irrigation aid.