State crimes and state harms: a tale of two definitional frameworks

Criminologists have long debated the issue of how to define crime, and hence, the scope of criminological inquiry. For years, some critical criminologists have argued for expanded definitions of crime that include harmful behaviors of the state that may not be officially defined as criminal. Other critical criminologists have argued that existing legal frameworks may be used to study varieties of state crime, and that defining the harmful actions of the state as criminal is important to help mobilize public support for their control. In this paper, we first trace the historical development of these two perspectives, and then offer a tentative solution to the seeming tension between these two perspectives.     

Bureaupreneurs in China: we did it our way

This article explores the different and sometimes conflicting explanations of the success of the collective enterprises (town–village-enterprise) in China during the first phase of transition (1979–1995). It is argued that explanations, relying on cultural variables are not sustainable and this for two reasons. First, the importance of the collective enterprise is shrinking while the private sector is clearly on the rise. Second, other factors, referring to characteristics of the local and central political, administrative and economic environment, in which the Chinese enterprise has to (had to?) operate, provide for a sufficient explanation of the peculiar structure of the Chinese collective enterprises. These enterprises are seen as the result of ?bureau-preneurship’ because local bureaucrats were integrated in their management in order to pre-empt predatory behaviour and to facilitate the relationships with the central institutions. The article contributes to the property rights’ theory of the firm as it analyses an empirically very important case in which firms with unclear property rights and structures, apparently not conducive for incentives, might still be the most efficient option.     

The Norwegian Barents Sea Management Plan and the EC Marine Strategy Directive: Some Political and Legal Challenges with an Ecosystem-Based Approach to the Protection of the European Marine Environment

This article addresses some of the implications of the EU's proposed Marine Strategy Directive for ongoing work in the regional seas conventions and for national work on regional marine strategies. The starting point is the proposed directive's focus on the ecosystem approach to the protection of the marine environment. Key elements within this approach are analysed, such as integration of environmental considerations into other policy areas; introduction of ecological quality objectives; and establishment of holistic monitoring and assessment programmes. Is it possible to transform these concepts into legally binding obligations? What will the implications of the proposed directive be for the rights and obligations of EU Member States under international law? A Management Plan for the Norwegian Part of the Barents Sea ('Barents Plan') was adopted by the Norwegian Government in March 2006 and approved by the Norwegian Storting (Parliament) in June 2006. It provides an example of a concrete application of the concepts in the proposed directive. Based on an analysis of the proposed Marine Strategy Directive and the Barents Plan, some key political and legal challenges are discussed in this article.     

Irrelevance of the soft budget constraint for the shortage phenomenon

Kornai's thesis that shortage results from demand expansions bred by the soft budget constraint, derives from his implicit assumption that price regimes of input and output firms are different. Since any firm is both an input and an output firm, which discards the assumption as logically untenable, excess demand can only turn up because of lower than contracted inputs of labor and management that are not offset by an adequate downward adjustment of earnings. Expansions of demand that appear to be autonomous, are incited by uncertain deliveries of inputs, that is, by inefficiency (of output firms) as well. A by far the largest part of excess demand can be explained by state preferences for fast growth. As planners are more successful in generating investment, and the ensuing consumer, demand than in expanding production, shortage is inevitable regardless of the character of the firms' budget constraints.