Choosing Sides in the Horn of Africa: Wikileaks,the Ethiopia Imperative,and American Responses to Post-9/11 Regional Conflicts

The United States has faced at times the policy dilemma of seeing conflict erupt between two countries with which it maintains friendly diplomatic relations. The bureaucratic biases of relevant agencies can play an important role in determining whether to choose sides or remain neutral in these conflicts. In the early 1960s the Africa Bureau adopted a pro-Ethiopia bias that shaped American policy in the Horn of Africa. With the insights provided by the 2010 Wikileaks cables, this analysis explores how the “Ethiopia imperative” affected three inter-related American policy decisions in the Horn of Africa in the early twenty-first century: the decision to support Ethiopia despite its refusal to abide by a legally binding decision that favoured Eritrea following the 1998–2000 Eritrea–Ethiopia border war; to give Ethiopia what amounted to a “blank cheque” to invade Somalia in December 2006 and overthrow the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC); and to confront and isolate Eritrea diplomatically for waging proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia.     

Finance capital and peasants in Colonial West Africa: A comment on Cowen and Shenton

The presence of finance capital in colonial West Africa was predicated on the presence of imperial administration and merchant capital. From these it derived its profits. Cowen and Shenton suggested finance capital was seeking to diversify its sources of profit by engaging cocoa farmers in credit. While this may have been true for the period of cocoa boom before the First World War, it is argued in this piece that in 1938‐more than 20 years later ‐ the banks’ motivation was entirely defensive. No diversification was intended, and the action was directed at salvaging current business. This comment does not question Cowen and Shenton's ‘Fabianism’ thesis but substitutes merchant for finance capital as being in conflict with Colonial Office attitudes.     

Film and lantern lectures

The Dutch East Indies. By Amry Vandenbosch. University of California Press. 1941. (Second Edition.)

Wanderer Between Two Worlds: An Autobiography. By Norman Bent‐wich. 8/1/2>” x 5/3/4>”. Pp. vii+358. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd. 12s. 6d.

Gertrude Bell. By M. R. Ridley. Blackie. 206 pp. Map. Four illustrations. 3s. 6d.

Modern Iran. By L. P. Elwell‐Sutton. Pp. xii+234. Illustrations, maps and plans. Routledge. 1941. 12s. 6d.

Ruz‐gar i Nau. A quarterly illustrated magazine in Persian. No. 2, Autumn, 1941. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Ltd.; London: Hodder and Stoughton. is. net or 20 cents.

Turkey and Britain, is.

This Impertinence. By Peter Arnott. Jenkins. 12s. 6d

Soviet Asia : Its Records and its Problems. By E. S. Bates. Pp. 191 and a map. Jonathan Cape. 8s. 6d.

Green Prison. Twenty Years in Thailand. By W. Leigh Williams. 8/1/2>” x 6”. Pp. 352. Illustrations. London. Herbert Jenkins. 12s. 6d.

The Earth is the Lord's. A novel by Taylor Caldwell. Pp. 400. Collins. 19.41. 9s. 6d.

Genius of Friendship:T. E. Lawrence. By Henry Williamson. 10/1/4>” x 6/3/4>”. Pp. 78. Faber and Faber. 12s. 6d.     

Der Europ?ische Gerichtshof als Motor der Integration: Eine akteursbezogene Erkl?rung

For nearly five decades, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has developed a decisively pro-European case law and has become the ??engine of integration??. Institutional explanations shed light on the Court??s room for manoevre. They have to be complemented by actor-centered explanations that shed light on the judges?? motives of action. The explanation offered by the following paper is unfolded in two steps. In the first one, the article describes idiosyncrasies of the European law discourse that already shaped the judges before they were appointed. The analysis of the idiosyncrasies corresponds to a scepticism towards the idea of national sovereignty, a belief in the necessity of creative and idealist, law-augmenting judges and a dominance of output-oriented legitimization strategies. In a second step, the article shows that in the sociological sense the ECJ judges constitute a group. While the individual judges share an understanding of the aims and functions of European law, the group develops its own identity and grants status to those who perform successful actions with respect to the common integration agenda. This explanation is more realistic than ??rational choice?? explanations which point to the direct and personal benefits that judges derive from their pro-European case law.