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971.
This note examines the existence of a long‐run, cointegrating relationship between population and per capita GDP in India for 1950–93. Unit root tests show that per capita GDP is integrated of order one while population is integrated of order zero; further, estimation of the bi‐variate relationship using the cointegration procedure of Johansen shows that no long‐run relationship exists. Thus, population growth neither causes per capita income growth nor is caused by it. A corollary is that population growth neither stimulates per capita income growth nor detracts from it.  相似文献   
972.
Much of conventional economic development ends up as a transfer of wealth from the public sector to successful firms. Instead, local governments would be better off working to support the efforts of community-based development organizations to expand the economic pie for those most in need. Suggestions are made of ways to bring about equity development programs that would help those most in need rather than merely subsidizing established businesses.  相似文献   
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Appendix     
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Why the First World War ended in 1918 and not earlier remains a major puzzle. We propose a new theory that emphasizes how honor prolongs wars beyond what rationalist theories can explain. It argues that when honor is insulted, an affronted actor will strive to punish the offender. Absent an apology, the pursuit of a satisfactory punishment leads the affronted belligerent to ignore unfavorable battlefield information, hold logically irreconcilable beliefs, process information in emotional terms, and obsess over status. We predict that wars of prevention and territorial occupation are most likely to elicit honor considerations. We test our argument against an obscure episode in the war where Germany and the United States made peace overtures in December 1916. We demonstrate that honor concerns made Entente decision makers see German aggression as an affront to their honor that only the destruction of Germany's political regime could redress.  相似文献   
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Through a comparison of three periods of health and pension reform in Chile, this article develops an explanation for the incremental form of social policy change that some Latin American nations have witnessed in recent years, despite the dramatic rise of left governments. It describes “postretrenchment politics,” which constitutes a realignment in the way politics plays out in countries that have undergone social policy retrenchment. In postretrenchment politics, the strengthened position of private business interests, combined with political learning legacies and lock‐in effects generated by reforms, results in incremental political change, despite renewed efforts by left parties to address inequality. Global capital also plays an important contextual role, and may influence postretrenchment politics. In postretrenchment politics, newly reformed systems may achieve greater equity, but they do so in fragmented form.  相似文献   
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