Barriers to third‐party advertising in Canadian elections

A survey of public interest group leaders suggests some reasons why few third parties have chosen to advertise in recent elections. It indicates that public interest groups abstain from election advertising not because of the strictures of the Canada Elections Act but for other reasons, notably cost and fear of losing charitable status or of jeopardizing their access to and influence with officials. While the significance of these findings is limited by the scale of the survey, the results do raise tantalizing questions that warrant further research.     

Neighborhoods,Schools, and Adolescent Violence: Ecological Relative Deprivation,Disadvantage Saturation,or Cumulative Disadvantage?

Journal of Youth and Adolescence - Neighborhood and school socioeconomic “disadvantage” are consequential for youth violence perpetration. This study considers alternative ecological...     

The Rise of Gulf War Paradigm 2.0

The adage that “it is always easier to fight the last war” is one that readily can be applied to the United States and its armed forces for not predicting the scale and type of operations encountered in the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. This article argues that the lack of preparation in the post-invasion phases arose from an institutional attachment to a preferred paradigm of warfare, as exemplified by the Persian Gulf War of 1991. This paradigm, though, has been substantially resurrected and re-configured to suit the fighting preferences of the American armed forces in its protracted encounters in Iraq and Afghanistan. Far from re-orienting its organization and mindset to meet the challenges of so-called counterinsurgency campaigns, as much current advocacy maintains, the military has reverted to the form of warfare it knows best.     

The fairness of sanctions: some implications for optimal enforcement policy

In this article we incorporate notions of the fairness of sanctionsinto the standard model of public enforcement. When both theprobability and magnitude of sanctions may be varied, the usualsolution involves a very high sanction and a relatively lowprobability of enforcement if individuals are risk neutral.When the issue of fairness is added to the analysis, the optimalsanction generally is not extremely high because such a sanctionwould be seen as unfair. The optimal probability of imposingsanctions may be higher than in the usual case (to offset thelower sanction) or lower than in the usual case (because thelower sanction reduces the effectiveness of enforcement).     

J.M. Keynes and the Personal Politics of Reparations: Part 2

The second part of this article shows that John Maynard Keynes worked closely with the German Finance and Foreign ministries as a supposed neutral expert in October 1922. He supported passive resistance to the French in the Ruhr without regard to its effects on the currency, secretly collaborated in writing the German reparations note of June 1923, and then praised his own work in a weekly that he controlled. Keynes opposed the 1929 Young Plan that re-scheduled the German debt and declined to accept modern thinking on overcoming the transfer problem.