General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior*

This research addresses the assumption that “general deterrence” is an important key to enhanced compliance with regulatory laws. Through a survey of 233 firms in several industries in the United States, we sought to answer the following questions: (1) When severe legal penalties are imposed against a violator of environmental laws, do other companies in the same industry actually learn about such “signal cases”? (2) Does knowing about “signal cases” change firms’ compliance‐related behavior? It was found that only 42 percent of respondents could identify the “signal case,” but 89 percent could identify some enforcement actions against other firms, and 63 percent of firms reported having taken some compliance‐related actions in response to learning about such cases. Overall, it is concluded that because most firms are in compliance already (for a variety of other reasons), this form of “explicit general deterrence” knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance routines.     

Error minimization and deterrence in agency control

In the presented oversight model, in which a regulatory agency may collude with regulatees, a watchdog organization may scrutinize the agency’s decision-making and find evidence speaking for collusive behavior. Found evidence is of a specific, stochastic quality. Courts will overturn the administrative decision when the evidence presented in court exceeds a minimum quality standard set by the political principal. Lowering the quality standard increases the odds of finding evidence of sufficient quality and, hence, leads to increasing collusion deterrence and to a lower probability of acquitting collusive administrators (type I error), but also to a higher probability of convicting an innocent administrator (type II error). It is shown that, when welfare-maximization gives rise to an interior solution, the welfare-maximizing standard of evidence is lower than the one that merely minimizes the costs of legal errors without taking deterrence costs into account, but will imply incomplete deterrence. However, conditions can and will be identified under which both error cost minimization and complete deterrence coincide with welfare-maximization.     

Teenage suicide in King County, Washington. I. Rates of suicide for 26 years

The population-adjusted rate of teenage suicide in King County, Washington, was reviewed for the 26 years from 1959 to 1984. For the entire period, the rate did not change significantly. An abrupt change did occur during the middle of this period, but, for reasons discussed in the text, this may well represent a change in procedures and philosophy of death certification rather than a real change in rate. Reasons for the apparent discrepancy with national statistics are discussed.     

Job demands, job resources, and burnout among police officers

The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between job demands, job resources, and burnout, and to examine if burnout could predict both work and health-related outcomes among police officers. The participants were 223 Norwegian police officers, and data were collected using a questionnaire. The study was part of a national survey of both health care and non-health care professions. The overall level of burnout was low among police officers compared to other occupational groups tested in Norway. Both job demands and job resources were related to burnout, especially work-family pressure was an important predictor for all of the three burnout dimensions. Burnout predicted individual outcomes, such as psychosomatic complaints and satisfaction with life, as well as work outcomes, such as job satisfaction, intention to quit, and organizational commitment. Suggestions for potential interventions to reduce burnout and negative individual and organizational consequences are presented.     

US Presidential popularity and opportunities to coerce North Korea: a quantitative test 1990 2000

This paper investigates how North Korean behaviour towards boththe United States and South Korea is influenced by the popularityof the American President. The study applies theories relatingto strategic conflict avoidance and signalling to suggest thatthe American President is able to demonstrate a willingnessto use force when he is unpopular and as such is better ableto coerce Pyongyang. Using a time-series model, I demonstratethat the North Koreans become more cooperative towards the UnitedStates in response to decreases in presidential popularity andincreasing levels of US inflation. However, the study also showsthat the North Koreans do not alter their behaviour towardsthe South Koreans in response to low American President Popularityratings. The research, therefore, suggests that the North Koreansbelieve that the United States would be unable to launch a diversionaryattack in response to North Korean behaviour towards the South.This study provides a clear support for the strategic avoidanceof conflict hypothesis and suggests that the American Presidentsare best able to coerce North Korea when they are unpopularat home. Received for publication August 31, 2005. Accepted for publication December 21, 2005.     

Stag Hunting with the State AG: Anti-Tobacco Litigation and the Emergence of Cooperation Among State Attorneys General

Employing a critical-mass theory of collective action, this article models the emergence of cooperation among state attorneys general in litigation against the tobacco industry. These suits were not independent events, nor was cooperation based on prior agreement among the attorneys general. Rather, cooperation emerged over time as a result of interdependent decision-making, with early lawsuits increasing the likelihood of later suits. The model emphasizes the "production function" of the collective good and the heterogeneity of the attorneys general and their political environments as keys to the development of cooperation. The model is tested against data using event history analysis.     

Spatial variation of refractive index in a pane of float glass.

In the statistical interpretation of forensic glass evidence it is standard practice to make the assumption of homogeneity of the refractive index (RI) of the source glass, or of localized homogeneity. However, the work of Locke and Hayes showed that, for toughened windscreen glass, this assumption might not be true. This work is well cited, but there appears to have been little follow-on published research. Furthermore, the toughening process is something known to affect the refractive index, and is a process that float glass does not undergo. Float glass is a major component of casework in New Zealand and for that reason it would be interesting to know whether the findings of Locke and Hayes apply when dealing with float glass. In this paper we describe an experiment similar to that of Locke and Hayes, systematically examining the variation of RI in a pane of float window glass. It was found that, although there were no systematic differences in refractive index, there were observable differences across the pane.