Cost Benefit Study of the New Covent Garden Market

The Hon. Editor has received the following letter commenting on Professor Kirk's and Mr. Sloyan's article on the New Covent Garden Market (Vol. 56 Spring 1978). The author is lecturer in applied economics in the Department of Social and Economic Research, University of Glasgow. Mr. Heald's letter is followed by a reply by Professor Kirk on behalf of Mr. Sloyan and himself.     

Social welfare functions when preferences are convex,strictly monotonic,and continuous

The paper shows that if the class of admissible preference orderings is restricted in a manner appropriate for economic and political models, then Arrow's impossibility theorem for social welfare functions continues to be valid. Specifically if the space of alternatives is R ₊ ⁿ , n ≥ 3, where each dimension represents a different public good and if each person's preferences are restricted to be convex, continuous, and strictly monotonic, then no social welfare function exists that satisfies unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and nondictatorship.     

Political variables in political socialization: Reply to “the dynamics of interpersonal attitudinal influence”

In this paper two arguments are advanced with regard to parental influence on adolescent political attitudes. First, variables like parental affect, which are of considerable theoretical interest to social psychologists, are of relatively little interest to the system-level concerns of political scientists because of their lack of variance. Second, the additive issue salience/perceptual accuracy model I proposed (1974) is a better fit to the data than a multiplicative cue-giving/parental affect model proposed in this journal by Cundy (1979). The fit of the two models is tested with the Jennings (1965) socialization data.Cundy, D. T. The dynamics of interpersonal attitudinal influence.Political Behavior, 1979,1, 269–284.     

Assessing the results of public expenditure: program evaluation in the Canadian federal government

Abstract. In an attempt to tighten up its financial systems and improve control of expenditures, the Canadian federal government has set up a new office, that of the Comptroller General. One of this Office's responsibilities is to administer the Treasury Board's policy on program evaluation, which says that all government programs should be periodically reviewed for their effectiveness in meeting goals and for the efficiency with which they are managed. The paper describes the Office's approach to program evaluation, reviews program evaluation policy in three other countries and discusses the principles and practical problems which limit the application of evaluation research. Evaluation activity in Canada is endangered in its cradle by two threats: the tendency of proponents to over-exuberance; and the cynics' view that the activity is of such limited applicability that potential savings are negligible. A third problem is a tendency to fuse together policy-related and management-related assessment activity. Evaluation activity conducted from the operational management point of view which takes program goals for granted will surely result in sequences of small victories and economies. This is worth doing well. But the dramatic import of effectiveness evaluation as a ‘bottom line’ for judging the worth of whole programs — that is, as a policy tool — should not be allowed to generate false expectations about the scope for improvement in routine management of the public service. Sommaire. En vue de fortifier ses systèmes financiers et d'améliorer le contrôle exercé sur ses dépenses, le gouvemement fédéral canadien a créé un nouveau poste, celui du Contrôleur général. Une des responsabilités de cette function est d'administrer la politique du Conseil du trésor en matière d'évaluation de programmes. Cette politique exige que les programmes gouvernementaux soient évalués périodiquement afin de déterminer leur efficacitéà rencontrer leurs objectifs ainsi que la capacité de rendement de leur gestion. Ce document décrit l'approche du Bureau du Contrôleur général en matière d'évaluation de programmes; examine les politiques correspondantes dans trois autres pays; et discute des principes et des problèmes pratiques qui limitent l'applicabilité de l'évaluation en recherche.     

Book reviews

A. L. Meiendorf, Optimizatsiya khozyaistvennykh reshenii: metod analiza prirashchenii. Series: Aktual'nye problemy sel'skogo khozyaistva. Moscow: ‘Ekonomika’, 1976.

Oliver H. Radkey, The Unknown Civil War in Soviet Russia. A Study of the Green Movement in the Tambov Region, 1920–21. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1976. xiv+457 pp. $12.95.

Roy and Zhores Medvedev, Khrushchev—The Years in Power. London: OUP, 1977. xi+198 pp. £3.95.

Daniel F. Calhoun, The United Front: the TUC and the Russians, 1923–1928. Cambridge: CUP, 1976. 450 pp. £10.50.

Gabriel Gorodetsky, The Precarious Truce. Anglo‐Soviet Relations 1924–27. Cambridge: CUP, 1977. 289 pp. £9.00.

Herbert S. Dinerstein, The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976. 302 pp. $14.95.

Donald R. Kelley, Kenneth R. Stunkel, Richard R. Wescott, The Economic Superpowers and the Environment: The United States, The Soviet Union, and Japan. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1976. 335 pp.

Fred Singleton (ed.), Environmental Misuse in the Soviet Union. New York and London: Praeger Publishers, 1976. xvii+103 pp. $13.50. £8.80.

Peter H. Juviler, Revolutionary Law and Order. Politics and Social Change in the USSR. New York: The Free Press, and London: Collier MacMillan, 1976. xii+274 pp. £11.05.

Richard Szawlowski, The System of the International Organizations of the Communist Countries. Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1976. 322 pp.

Jürg Meister, Soviet Warships of the Second World War. London: Macdonald & Jane, 1977. 348 pp. £7.95.