Democracy’s effect on economic growth: A pooled time-series analysis, 1951–1980

The relationship between democracy and economic growth has concerned social scientists since the 17th century, but recent democracy movements make this question especially important today. Do poor countries face a cruel trade-off between democracy and growth? Do democracy and growth go together as a “win-win” proposition? Or is democracy irrelevant to growth? Using pooled annual time-series data from 1951–1980 for 106 countries, including 88 non-core countries, we explore long-term and short-term direct and indirect effects of democracy on growth. Little or no direct effect emerges, but positive indirect effects appear via two mechanisms: a marginally significant effect via investment and a robust effect via government expenditure. Democracy also has a robust non-linear effect on economic growth via social unrest, inhibiting growth under non-democratic regimes and furthering it in highly democratic ones. Combining these findings, we conclude that democracy does not significantly hamper economic growth, and under many circumstances slightly boosts it.     

Of Medicine, Race, and American Law: The Bubonic Plague Outbreak of 1900

In March of 1900 several cases of bubonic plague were discovered in San Francisco's Chinatom. In response the health authorities, at the instance of the Surgeon General of the United States, sought to implement a series of extraordinarily coercive measures aimed at the city's Asian inhabitants. The measures provoked an uproar among the Chinese, and they determined to challenge them in the federal Circuit Court for the Northern District of California. This essay, based on extensive research in court records, the archives of the U.S. Public Health Service, and press accounts in English and Chinese, documents the complex events that gave rise to the cases of Wong Wai v. Williamson and Jew Ho v. Williamson and the cases themselves as they unfolded in the courts. The cases raised new and dificult questions of fact and of law and tested as few other cases have before or since a court's capacity to act as arbiter between individual rights (and the rights of an ostracized minority at that) and the public interest in a period of acute health emergency.     

A Public-Choice View of Swiss Liberty

This article compares the provisions of the American and Swissconstitutions from a public-choice perspective. Accordingly,the Swiss Constitution is seen as one designed to bring abouta transmission of citizens' desires into political action, whereasthe U.S. Constitution is designed to prevent the misuse of grantedpower. The specific level of analysis employed here is the principal-agentmodel, which is used to examine collective decisionmaking atthe constitutional, legislative, and para-constitutional levels.The article then considers the role of the courts as arbiterof constitutional questions and conflicts.     

Dangerousness

Saleem Shah played a major role in the development of both policy and research concerning the prediction of dangerousness to others over two decades. During that period his commitment to the welfare of people with mental illness led him first to challenge the legitimacy of such predictions and later to support research to improve them. His ideas were central to most of the research that has been done in this area. This article suggests a direction for future research concerning the prediction of dangerousness to others that elaborates and extends his thinking by focusing on the research necessary to help individuals with mental illnesses to minimize their involvement in violence.     

The Advantages of Pure Forms of Parliamentary Democracy over Mixed Forms

It is often said that parliament shouldrepresent the opinions found in thepopulation and that government should beheld accountable for its political program.It is shown that these two goals rely ontwo different basic models of democracywhich are not fully compatible with eachother: the model of a pure representativedemocracy and the model of a pure two partycompetition. Unaccountable governments,voter alienation, strategic voting, andgovernmental instability are shown to beconsequences of this institutional mix.These problems may be avoided with reformsin the direction of one or the other basicmodel.     

Voting competitions with interested politicians: Platforms do not converge to the preferences of the median voter

We examine equilibrium voting strategies for elections with interested politicians facing uncertainty about voter pReferences. If politicians' utilities are defined over the set of strategies that voters select (instead of being dependent only on the probability of winning an election), equilibrium strategies will diverge (instead of converging to the median voter's pReferences) as long as politicians have different pReferences. We present conditions (i) for political compromise, and (ii) for politicians with different utility functions to merge into parties with complete strategic agreement.