A community paradigm of organized crime

This article reviews the available empirical research on organized crime and suggests that an important dimension of that research is the close symbiosis between organized crime groups and the communities in which they operate. As such, it is hypothesized that the concept of community may be important to explaining the persistence and durability of organized crime. A community model proposed by Roland Warren, which seeks to integrate much of the sociological literature on the community, and which delineates the basic functions of the community is presented as a means of organizing the available date about organized crime and explaining organized crime’s functional and latent aspects.     

Qarase v. Bainimarama: the End of Democratic Rule in Fiji?

The judgment in Qarase v. Bainimarama provided a legal basis for the 2006 military coup in Fiji and stated that the President was entitled to grant authority to the military to act outside of the powers prescribed by the written Constitution. According to the ruling, the Royal Prerogative powers that remained in government following British rule could be utilised by the President at any time that he considered it necessary. This paper explores the rationale for that judgment and the role that Royal Prerogative powers may play in the governance of countries that were previously subject to British rule. It further considers the impact of this judgment upon democracy in Fiji and the future protection of human rights for its citizens.     

Unwanted sex among young adults in the United States: the role of physical disability and cognitive performance

This study examined associations between unwanted sexual experiences and both physical disability and cognitive performance in a nationally representative sample of young adults. We used data from 11,878 participants (ages 26-32) in Waves I, III, and IV of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health). Logistic regressions determined associations between physical disability and level of cognitive performance (using a modified Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test) and the odds of experiencing physically forced and nonphysically coerced sex. Approximately 24% of females and 4% of males reported unwanted sexual experiences. Compared to respondents without disabilities, females with a physical disability had greater odds of experiencing forced sex (OR = 1.49; 95% CI [1.06, 2.08]), whereas males with a physical disability had greater odds of coerced sex (OR = 1.90; 95% CI [1.02, 3.52]). Compared to those with average cognitive performance scores, females with scores above 110 had slightly higher odds of coerced sex (OR = 1.20; 95% CI [1.03-1.41]). Further research on pathways underlying these associations is needed to inform prevention efforts.     

Gerrymandering Roll Calls in Congress, 1879–2000

We argue that the standard toolbox used in electoral studies to assess the bias and responsiveness of electoral systems can also be used to assess the bias and responsiveness of legislative systems. We consider which items in the toolbox are the most appropriate for use in the legislative setting, then apply them to estimate levels of bias in the U.S. House from 1879 to 2000. Our results indicate a systematic bias in favor of the majority party over this period, with the strongest bias arising during the period of "czar rule" (51st–60th Congresses, 1889–1910) and during the post-packing era (87th–106th Congresses, 1961–2000). This finding is consistent with the majority party possessing a significant advantage, either in "buying" vote options, in setting the agenda, or both.     

The Logic of Gamson's Law: Pre-election Coalitions and Portfolio Allocations

Gamson's Law—the proposition that coalition governments will distribute portfolios in proportion to each member party's contribution of seats to the coalition—has been one of the most prominent landmarks in coalitional studies since the 1970s. However, standard bargaining models of government formation argue that Gamson's Law should not hold, once one controls for relevant indicators of bargaining power. In this article, we extend these bargaining models by allowing parties to form pre-election pacts. We argue that campaign investments by pact signatories depend on how they anticipate portfolios will be distributed and, thus, signatories have an incentive to precommit to portfolio allocation rules. We show that pacts will sometimes agree to allocate portfolios partly or wholly in proportion to members' contributions of seats to the coalition; this increases each signatory's investment in the campaign, thereby conferring external benefits (in the form of a larger probability of an alliance majority) on other coalition members. Empirical tests support the model's predictions.