Inter-rater reliability of dynamic risk assessment with sexual offenders

Abstract

This paper describes the inter-rater reliability of the Structured Assessment of Risk and Need (SARN, formerly known as Structured Risk Assessment). The SARN is a structured framework for identifying sexual offenders’ dynamic risk factors. The SARN comprises 16 dynamic risk factors, categorized into four domains: Sexual Interests, Distorted Attitudes, Socio-Affective Functioning and Self-Management. Two studies, utilizing three samples, are reported. Study 1 examined the inter-rater reliability of four SARN cases with a sample of seven expert raters. Results indicated high inter-rater reliability amongst these participants. Study 2 examined the reliability of SARN with two samples who had received training before supplying inter-rater data (N=88). Results provided some support for the reliability of SARN. However, strength of reliability was dependent upon the method of analysis applied (percentage agreement, Cohen's Kappa, intra-class correlation coefficients). These results are discussed in terms of their clinical and methodological implications.     

Installing a Safety on the ‘Loaded Gun’? China’s institutional reforms,National Security Commission and Sino–Japanese crisis (in)stability

As China’s active assertion of its claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has increasingly crowded the surrounding waters and airspace with military and paramilitary forces, the risk of a Sino–Japanese crisis has reached unprecedented heights. Neither side wants conflict, but the increased frequency and proximity at which vessels and aircraft encounter one another means that overall risk has grown proportionately. Were a miscalculation or even an unintended low-level incident to occur, de-escalation would hinge on each side’s respective internal crisis management capabilities and political leaders’ ability to communicate expeditiously. This article analyzes China’s side of the ledger. Specifically, it assesses the extent to which institutional reforms since the 2001 US–China EP-3 crisis have ameliorated longstanding weaknesses in China’s crisis management capabilities and its ability to communicate via hotlines with Japan. While significant issues and obstacles to further urgently needed improvements remain, with the establishment of a Central National Security Commission (CNSC) and other recent reforms, Beijing may finally be achieving modest improvements. Bilaterally, however, no Sino–Japanese crisis hotline exists to date.     

To Bridge the Divide between Evidence and Policy: Reduce Ambiguity as Much as Uncertainty

Policy makers cannot consider all evidence relevant to policy. They use two shortcuts—emotions and beliefs to understand problems and “rational” ways of establishing the best evidence on solutions—to act quickly in complex, multilevel policy‐making environments. Many studies only address one part of this problem. Improving the supply of evidence helps reduce scientific and policy maker uncertainty. However, policy makers also combine their beliefs with limited evidence to reduce ambiguity by choosing one of several possible ways to understand and solve a problem. We use this insight to consider solutions designed to “close the evidence–policy gap.”     

Doing,Allowing, and the State

The doing/allowing distinction plays an important role in our thinking about a number of legal issues, such as the need for criminal process protections, prohibitions on torture, the permissibility of the death penalty and so on. These are areas where, at least initially, there seem to be distinctions between harms that the state inflicts and harms that it merely allows. In this paper I will argue for the importance of the doing/allowing distinction as applied to state action. Sunstein, Holmes, Vermeule and others have presented influential arguments for the claim that where the state is concerned the doing/allowing distinction has no moral significance, even if it does elsewhere. I show that these arguments can be resisted. In doing so, I defend some important distinctions and principles that help us understand the state’s role in protecting people from harm.     

The impact of consumer advocates on regulatory policy in the electric utility sector

We examine the effect of consumer advocate participation in administrative procedures on regulatory policy. We use a unique panel database of rate reviews conducted for US electric utilities from 1980 to 2007 to assess how state consumer advocates affect Public Utility Commission decisions on utilities’ allowed financial returns and rate structures. We find first that utilities experience fewer rate reviews in states with consumer advocates, consistent with utilities strategically postponing requests for rate increases. Second, after controlling for observed and unobserved state characteristics, we find that PUCs in states with consumer advocates permit returns on equity that are on average 0.45 percentage points lower than states without advocates—equivalent to a $7.9 million (3.7 %) reduction in average utility operating income, all else equal. Third, consumer advocates are associated with lower residential rates relative to other customer classes. Our findings provide statistical support for the thesis that institutionalizing interest group representation in administrative procedures is one way for legislatures indirectly to influence agency-determined policies.     

Risk Management and Risk Avoidance in Agency Decision Making

Despite decades of efforts to enhance the public's role in bureaucratic decision making, citizens still tend to have little influence on the decisions that public managers make. Solutions often focus on the processes or structures of participation, but such changes may be of limited effectiveness if the structure is only part of the problem. Although much research has argued the normative justification for including the public, noting that frameworks that do not encourage genuine participation may diminish rather than enhance public influence, there has been less focus on how participants’ divergent frames of reference may also diminish the influence of public input. This research explores this gap from a risk management perspective, suggesting that public managers tend to view risk as something to be managed, whereas citizens tend to view risk as best avoided.     

Awareness of Corruption in the Community and Public Service: a Victorian Study

Corruption hurts the public and undermines government. This study of perceptions of corruption in Victoria shows that the community believes corruption is on the increase, yet this view is not shared by public servants. In general corruption is not on the radar of senior Victorian public servants. There are more perceptions of corruption in line agencies than in central agencies. Behaviours most commonly suspected and observed were hiring family and friends, conflict of interest, abuse of discretion and abuse of information. One‐ third of public servants surveyed thought there were opportunities for bribery, yet only 4% had suspected bribery and less than one per cent had personally observed it. Almost half do not believe they would be protected from victimisation should they report corruption. The data reported here poses challenges in thinking about corruption when devising integrity standards in the public service.     

Prescribing engagement in environmental risk assessment for gene drive technology

Gene drive technology is a nascent biotechnology with the potential to purposefully alter or eliminate a species. There have been broad calls for engagement to inform gene drive governance. Over the past seven years, the gene drive community has been developing risk assessment guidelines to determine what form future gene drive risk assessments take, including whether and how they involve engagement. To explore who is developing these guidelines and how engagement in risk assessment is being prescribed, we conduct a document analysis of gene drive risk assessment guideline documents from 2014 to 2020. We found that a narrow set of organizations have developed 10 key guideline documents and that with only one exception the documents prescribe a narrow, vague, or completely absent role for engagement in gene drive risk assessment. Without substantively prescribed engagement in guidelines, the relevance, rigor, and trustworthiness of gene drive risk assessment and governance will suffer.