Reimagining instrument constituencies: the case of conservation policy in Mexico

Policy Sciences - Throughout the developing world, payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs are popular policy instruments that allow those who rely on such amenities as drinking water and...     

The promises and pitfalls of polysemic ideas: ‘One Health’ and antimicrobial resistance policy in Australia and the UK

Policy Sciences - Recent scholarship posits that ambiguous (‘polysemic’) ideas are effective for coalition building between diverse stakeholders: their capacity to be interpreted...     

Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina

Autocrats depend on a capable secret police. Anecdotal evidence, however, often characterizes agents as surprisingly mediocre in skill and intellect. To explain this puzzle, this article focuses on the career incentives underachieving individuals face in the regular security apparatus. Low-performing officials in hierarchical organizations have little chance of being promoted or filling lucrative positions. To salvage their careers, these officials are willing to undertake burdensome secret police work. Using data on all 4,287 officers who served in autocratic Argentina (1975–83), we study biographic differences between secret police agents and the entire recruitment pool. We find that low-achieving officers were stuck within the regime hierarchy, threatened with discharge, and thus more likely to join the secret police for future benefits. The study demonstrates how state bureaucracies breed mundane career concerns that produce willing enforcers and cement violent regimes. This has implications for the understanding of autocratic consolidation and democratic breakdown.     

Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789–2000

Why does the influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time? Building on prevailing answers, we develop a model, Strategic Party Government, which highlights the electoral motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between parties. We test this theory using the entire range of House and Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic behavior of parties complements members' preferences as an explanation for variation in party influence. Specifically, the strongest predictors of one party's voting unity are the unity of the opposing party and the difference between the parties in the preceding year. Moreover, we find strong links between party behavior in Congress and electoral outcomes: an increase in partisan influence on legislative voting has adverse electoral costs, while winning contested votes has electoral benefits.     

A constitutional interpretation of the firm

When members of a firm make firm-specific investments they will earn rents. Potential rent-seeking on the part of the owner of the firm and other employees reduces the value of an employee's firm-specific investment and, as a result, reduces the level of those investments. In this context the firm can be thought of as a set of interdependent relationships where the actions of any one individual can affect the rents of all others. The owner of the firm will desire to set up an institutional arrangement to protect the individual's property rights in specific investments as part of his effort to maximize profit. Establishing this institutional arrangement is similar to the establishment of a constitution by the state or other organization. This constitution protects the property rights of the members of the firm and as a result encourages the creation of property, that is, the firm-specific investments. The constitution of a firm consists of a set of interdependent explicit and implicit contracts between the firm and its various members, as well as mechanisms for enforcing and monitoring these contracts. As a practical matter, it is obvious that workers normally do not enjoy costless or near-costless mobility, and thus an ordinary “at will” employment contract may no longer be sufficient to induce workers to join a firm. If, in order to function productively within an enterprise, individuals have to accumulate, and pay for, firm-specific capital assets, the simple neoclasical logic fails (Furubotn, 1988: 167).     

B. Reviews

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ARABIC LITERATURE. Volume 1: Arabic Literature to the End of the Unayyad Period. Edited by A.F.L. Beeston, T.M.Johnstone, R.B.Serjeant and G.R.Smith, pp.xvi, 547. Cambridge University Press, 1983. £37.95.

AL‐MAQRIZI'S “BOOK OF CONTENTION AND STRIFE CONCERNING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BANU UMAYYA AND THE BANU HASHIM”. Translated into English, with an introduction and commentary by C.E.Bosworth. (Journal of Semitic Studies, Monograph No.3), Manchester, Department of Near Eastern Studies, University of Manchester, 1980. pp.157.

ARABIC CULTURE THROUGH ITS LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE. By M.H. Bakalla. London, Kegan Paul International, 1984. pp.371, 51, plates, maps.

ARABIC LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. By M.H. Bakalla. London, Mansell, 1983. pp.742.

LA RELATION DE THOMAS PELLOW: UNE LECTURE DU MAROC AU 18^e SIÈCLE. By Magali Morsy. (Synthèse No.12), Paris, Editions Recherche sur les Civilisations, 1983. pp.254, 17pl. FF.129.

ESPANA Y EL NORTE DE AFRICA: EL PROTECTORADO DE MARRUECOS (1912–56). By Victor Morales Lezcano. Madrid, Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia, 1984. pp.249. Photos., maps, diagrams. 600.00 ptas.

EGYPT AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION 1936–1945. By Thomas Mayer. Berlin, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983. pp.391 (paperback).

SUDAN. By M.W.Daly. (World Bibliographical Series, Vol.40.) Oxford (UK) & Santa Barbara (USA), Clio Press, 1983. pp.xvi, 176, 1 map. £19.50.

THE OTHER FACE OF OPEC: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE THIRD WORLD. ENERGY RESOURCES AND POLICIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA. By Ibrahim F.I. Shihata. London, Longman, 1982. pp.281 (paperback).

DEVELOPING EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN THE OIL STATES OF ARABIA: CONFLICTS OF PURPOSE AND FOCUS. By J.S.Birks and J.A.Rimmer. (Occasional Papers Series, No.21: Manpower and Migration Series, no.3). University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1984. pp.33. E2.50.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO IRAN: THE MIDDLE EAST LIBRARY COMMITTEE GUIDE. Edited by L.P.Elwell‐Sutton. Sussex, The Harvester Press/New Jersey, Barnes & Noble Books, 1984. pp.462.

ARABISCHE UND PERSISCHE PRIVATURKUNDEN DES 12. UND 13. JAHRHUNDERTS AUS ARDABIL (ASERBEIDSCHAN). By Monika Gronke. (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, Bd 72), Berlin, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 182. pp.555.

MYSTICISM AND DISSENT: SOCIORELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN QAJAR IRAN. By Mangol Bayat. Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse U.P., 1982. pp.xvii, 228. $25.00.

SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION AND POPULAR RESISTANCE IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1881–1908: REACTIONS TO EUROPEAN ECONOMIC PENETRATION. By Donald Quataert. New York, Columbia U.P., 1983. pp.xxii, 205. $45.50.     

Structure and Opportunity: Committee Jurisdiction and Issue Attention in Congress

This article explores how the congressional committee system shapes the dynamics of issue attention. Consisting of what is referred to as a congressional opportunity structure, it describes how committee jurisdictions provide an important institutional context for the attention paid to new issues in congressional hearings. This is illustrated through an examination of congressional attention to biotechnology over a 30-year period. This article finds that committees with broader jurisdictions were more active in biotechnology than committees with a narrow policy remit. However, these institutional effects varied widely, even within a single policy domain. This variation suggests that issue attention depends on the degree of fit between issue characteristics and the congressional opportunity structure. More broadly, the findings here illustrate the virtues of public policy research in studies of Congress.     

I'm Not That Liberal: Explaining Conservative Democratic Identification

The persistence of self-identified conservative Democrats in the electorate is puzzling. Both the ongoing Southern realignment and the recent ideological polarization should have resulted in conservative Democrats changing their party identification to accord with their discrepant ideology. Instead, the number of conservative Democrats, as a percentage of the total electorate, has held steady over the last 20 years. I propose an explanation for this phenomenon that draws upon theories of mass belief systems, as well as an element of recent political reality: the popular stigmatization of the word liberal. I argue that Democrats who are susceptible to elite cues garner positive affect toward the conservative label and negative affect toward the liberal label. They then identify themselves accordingly, regardless of their issue positions.