Divided We Stand? Democracy as a Method of Processing Conflicts1

Conflicts, liberty and peace do not coexist easily. Through most of history, civil peace was maintained by the threat of force. Contemporary ideologues of authoritarian regimes maintain that political conflicts inevitably result in violence, and the founders of modern representative institutions in the West have shared this view. Yet we now know that political institutions can cope with conflicts, that conflicts can be structured, regulated and contained, and that purely procedural rules can be effective in processing conflicts. Most importantly, we have come to realise that choosing governments through competitive elections is the only way to foster political freedom in divided societies. Competitive elections support social peace by enabling political forces to think in inter‐temporal terms. In turn, civil peace is maintained between elections when when opposition groups expect to be reasonably successful within the halls of representative institutions.     

Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War

Aerial bombardment has been an important component of counterinsurgency practice since shortly after it became a viable military technology in the early twentieth century. Due to the nature of insurgency, bombing frequently occurs in and around settled areas, and consequently it tends to generate many civilian casualties. However, the effectiveness of bombing civilian areas as a military tactic remains disputed. Using data disaggregated to the level of the smallest population unit and measured at multiple points in time, this article examines the effect of aerial bombardment on the pattern of local control in the Vietnam War. A variety of estimation methods, including instrumental variables and genetic matching, show that bombing civilians systematically shifted control in favor of the Viet Cong insurgents.     

Puppet Dictator in the Banana Republic? Re-examining Honduran–American Relations in the Era of Tiburcio Carías Andino, 1933–1938

Most scholarship depicts the Honduran president, Tiburcio Carías Andino, as little more than an obedient puppet of the United States and the United Fruit Company, the classic client dictator running the archetypal “banana republic.” Using both Honduran and American sources, this article challenges the validity of Carías’ supposedly unquestioned compliance with American demands, arguing that Carías was an independent actor capable of using, manipulating, and defying the United States in pursuit of his own disparate goals.     

Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789–2000

Why does the influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time? Building on prevailing answers, we develop a model, Strategic Party Government, which highlights the electoral motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between parties. We test this theory using the entire range of House and Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic behavior of parties complements members' preferences as an explanation for variation in party influence. Specifically, the strongest predictors of one party's voting unity are the unity of the opposing party and the difference between the parties in the preceding year. Moreover, we find strong links between party behavior in Congress and electoral outcomes: an increase in partisan influence on legislative voting has adverse electoral costs, while winning contested votes has electoral benefits.     

A constitutional interpretation of the firm

When members of a firm make firm-specific investments they will earn rents. Potential rent-seeking on the part of the owner of the firm and other employees reduces the value of an employee's firm-specific investment and, as a result, reduces the level of those investments. In this context the firm can be thought of as a set of interdependent relationships where the actions of any one individual can affect the rents of all others. The owner of the firm will desire to set up an institutional arrangement to protect the individual's property rights in specific investments as part of his effort to maximize profit. Establishing this institutional arrangement is similar to the establishment of a constitution by the state or other organization. This constitution protects the property rights of the members of the firm and as a result encourages the creation of property, that is, the firm-specific investments. The constitution of a firm consists of a set of interdependent explicit and implicit contracts between the firm and its various members, as well as mechanisms for enforcing and monitoring these contracts. As a practical matter, it is obvious that workers normally do not enjoy costless or near-costless mobility, and thus an ordinary “at will” employment contract may no longer be sufficient to induce workers to join a firm. If, in order to function productively within an enterprise, individuals have to accumulate, and pay for, firm-specific capital assets, the simple neoclasical logic fails (Furubotn, 1988: 167).     

B. Reviews

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ARABIC LITERATURE. Volume 1: Arabic Literature to the End of the Unayyad Period. Edited by A.F.L. Beeston, T.M.Johnstone, R.B.Serjeant and G.R.Smith, pp.xvi, 547. Cambridge University Press, 1983. £37.95.

AL‐MAQRIZI'S “BOOK OF CONTENTION AND STRIFE CONCERNING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BANU UMAYYA AND THE BANU HASHIM”. Translated into English, with an introduction and commentary by C.E.Bosworth. (Journal of Semitic Studies, Monograph No.3), Manchester, Department of Near Eastern Studies, University of Manchester, 1980. pp.157.

ARABIC CULTURE THROUGH ITS LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE. By M.H. Bakalla. London, Kegan Paul International, 1984. pp.371, 51, plates, maps.

ARABIC LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. By M.H. Bakalla. London, Mansell, 1983. pp.742.

LA RELATION DE THOMAS PELLOW: UNE LECTURE DU MAROC AU 18^e SIÈCLE. By Magali Morsy. (Synthèse No.12), Paris, Editions Recherche sur les Civilisations, 1983. pp.254, 17pl. FF.129.

ESPANA Y EL NORTE DE AFRICA: EL PROTECTORADO DE MARRUECOS (1912–56). By Victor Morales Lezcano. Madrid, Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia, 1984. pp.249. Photos., maps, diagrams. 600.00 ptas.

EGYPT AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION 1936–1945. By Thomas Mayer. Berlin, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983. pp.391 (paperback).

SUDAN. By M.W.Daly. (World Bibliographical Series, Vol.40.) Oxford (UK) & Santa Barbara (USA), Clio Press, 1983. pp.xvi, 176, 1 map. £19.50.

THE OTHER FACE OF OPEC: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE THIRD WORLD. ENERGY RESOURCES AND POLICIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA. By Ibrahim F.I. Shihata. London, Longman, 1982. pp.281 (paperback).

DEVELOPING EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN THE OIL STATES OF ARABIA: CONFLICTS OF PURPOSE AND FOCUS. By J.S.Birks and J.A.Rimmer. (Occasional Papers Series, No.21: Manpower and Migration Series, no.3). University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1984. pp.33. E2.50.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO IRAN: THE MIDDLE EAST LIBRARY COMMITTEE GUIDE. Edited by L.P.Elwell‐Sutton. Sussex, The Harvester Press/New Jersey, Barnes & Noble Books, 1984. pp.462.

ARABISCHE UND PERSISCHE PRIVATURKUNDEN DES 12. UND 13. JAHRHUNDERTS AUS ARDABIL (ASERBEIDSCHAN). By Monika Gronke. (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, Bd 72), Berlin, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 182. pp.555.

MYSTICISM AND DISSENT: SOCIORELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN QAJAR IRAN. By Mangol Bayat. Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse U.P., 1982. pp.xvii, 228. $25.00.

SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION AND POPULAR RESISTANCE IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1881–1908: REACTIONS TO EUROPEAN ECONOMIC PENETRATION. By Donald Quataert. New York, Columbia U.P., 1983. pp.xxii, 205. $45.50.