Judicial Politics on the Ground

This symposium focuses on judicial politics at the micro level. Its aim is to shed light on justice in action, drawing on an ethnographic approach to explore the routine decision‐making practices of judges and other legal actors, and to study their interactions with citizens and politicians. Each article is based on close observation of the interactions between legal professionals and administrative actors who are at the frontline in local and lower courts. By examining a variety of jurisdictions around the globe, the articles in this symposium offer fresh insight into “judicial politics on the ground.”     

Burundi: des identités ethnico-politiques forgées dans la violence

Taking the recent political situation as background, the author examines the rhetoric of political propaganda in Burundi. By considering several texts, both written (newspaper articles, politicians’ statements, political leaflets) and oral (speeches and radio declarations), of which long excerpts are reproduced, the author is able to demonstrate that all parties call for violence in Burundi, regardless of political side. The Other, whoever he may be, is systematically denied the right to exist; meanwhile, the exercise of violence appears as a means of delimiting the space belonging to each group. This in turn legitimates and generalizes daily use of violence.     

Élites in Omsk

A French sociologist provides a detailed analysis of the politics, economics, and political elite of Omsk oblast' in Western Siberia. Analysis covers oil politics, reactions to the August 1998 financial crisis, relations with Moscow, the role of entrepreneurs in politics, and the communist and nationalist oppositions. Focus is on the role of the governor and his relations with diverse political forces. The article also examines the gap between formal institutions and actual social and political practices.     

Authoritarian Regimes and Their Permitted Oppositions: Election Day Outcomes in Cuba

Electoral opposition to long‐established authoritarian regimes may be loyal or rejectionist. Loyal oppositionists vote to send a selective signal to rulers; rejectionist oppositionists vote blank or void the ballot in full disapproval. In Cuba, the number of candidates equals the number of seats, yet voters may vote blank, void, or selectively (choosing some but not all candidates on the ballot), although the Communist Party has campaigned for all candidates. This article uses a unique dataset for Cuba's 2013 National Assembly elections to study aggregate opposition outcomes. It shows the emergence of a loyal opposition, which sometimes votes for and sometimes against Communist Party candidates. The rejectionist opposition, stable over time, never votes for Communist Party candidates; it is found where the Communist Party behaves monopolistically. This combined opposition has better national‐level political information; it comes from more educated or larger urban areas or areas closer to Havana.