The Changing Structure of American Cities: A Study of the Diffusion of Innovation

Using historical and numerical analysis and the five-part schema, this study finds that over the past 50 years structural modifications and adaptations by American cities have generally followed the standard S curve of the diffusion of innovation. In tests of Kaufman's and Hirshman's theories of epochs of change from representativeness to administrative efficiency, this study determines that mayor-council cities have, in a standard innovation diffusion S curve, adopted many of the key features of council-manager cities, increasing their administrative efficiency. At the same time, council-manager cities, again in an S curve, have adopted many of the key features of mayor-council cities, increasing their political responsiveness. Fewer cities are now either distinctly mayor-council or council-manager in form, and most cities are structurally less distinct, constituting a newly merged or hybrid model of local government—the type III city.     

Location and other correlates of campus crime

Crime and security are major issues on a number of college campuses in the United States, yet little criminology research has been aimed at the campus setting. This article explores whixh aspects of the campus profile seem to contribute, or at least relate, to high levels of campus crime. A regression of crime rates on dimensions of the campus profile uncovered a number of correlates (specifically, measures of campus size and scholastic quality) in our sample of 222 colleges and universities. Somewhat surprisingly, the location of a campus—be it in an urban or a rural setting—had no impact on the level of its crime problem, though a slight influence on crime mix (proportion of crimes that are violent) was found.     

美国法律关于夫妻证据的一些规定

<正> 婚姻,给配偶一方提供了某种合法权利,即配偶一方有权拒绝提供不利另一方的证据。因此,便产生了配偶双方的权限以及依法提供证据的问题。婚姻的这种特殊关系,对维护夫妻间的     

Cognitive psychologists as expert witnesses

The first part of this paper defines a central problem for professional ethics: whether agents in professional roles are to act on their own moral perceptions or rather defer to those with special authority to make decisions within particular institutional settings. Specifically, should the psychologist decide for himself whether and how to testify as an expert witness, or should he allow the judge and lawyer to settle these questions for him? I argue that he must decide for himself and attempt to control the nature of his testimony. Given this preliminary conclusion, the second part of the paper argues on direct moral grounds first for a general presumption in favor of psychologists' testimony on the accuracy of eyewitnesses. Such testimony fits the legal criterion of reasonable doubt, if the psychologists' information is more accurate than that of the average juror and lawyer. Second, it is argued that the expert witness must resist intense adversarial pressures and present his testimony as impartially and objectively as possible.